# NOTE

This Microfiche meets the quality requirements of the American National Standard for Microfiche of Documents (ANSI PH5.9-1975). However, because of imperfections in the document from which it was made, it contains images that are illegible or difficult to read. The source document for this microfiche is the best copy that could be obtained prior to filming.

CIS
Congressional Information Service, Inc.
Washington, D.C.

# NARCOTICS CONTROL IN MEXICO

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

## SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

---

AUGUST 5, 1987

---

Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control

---

SCNAC-100-1-11

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

82-045 WASHINGTON : 1988

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

(100th Congress)

CHARLES B. RANGEL, New York, *Chairman*

PETER W. RODINO, JR., New Jersey
FORTNEY H. (PETE) STARK, California
JAMES H. SCHEUER, New York
CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii
FRANK J. GUARINI, New Jersey
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, District of Columbia
WILLIAM J. HUGHES, New Jersey
MEL LEVINE, California
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
EDOLPHUS "ED" TOWNS, New York
JAMES A. TRAFICANT, JR., Ohio

BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania
E. CLAY SHAW, JR., Florida
MICHAEL G. OXLEY, Ohio
STAN PARRIS, Virginia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
JOSEPH J. DIOGUARDI, New York
F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
TOM LEWIS, Florida

---

COMMITTEE STAFF

EDWARD H. JURITH, *Staff Director*
ELLIOTT A. BROWN, *Minority Staff Director*

# CONTENTS


| | Page |
|---|---|
| Opening statement of Chairman Charles B. Rangel | 1 |
| Testimony of Joseph E. Kelley, Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs, GAO; accompanied by Thomas Brogan and Dianne Rawl | 2 |
| Opening statement of Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman | 6 |
| Opening statement of Hon. James H. Scheuer | 10 |
| Opening statement of Hon. Frank J. Guarini | 10 |
| Opening statement of Hon. Solomon P. Ortiz | 11 |
| Opening statement of Hon. Michael G. Oxley | 12 |
| Testimony of Jerrold Mark Dion, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Department of State; Paul Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State; Thomas V. Cash, Assistant Administrator for Operations, DEA; and Dwight A. Ink, Bureau of Latin American Affairs, AID, Department of State | 12 |
| Opening statement of Hon. James. A. Traficant, Jr | 27 |
| Opening statement of Hon. Lawrence Coughlin | 32 |
| Prepared statements: | |
| The Honorable Charles B. Rangel | 45 |
| The Honorable Solomon P. Ortiz | 50 |
| Joseph E. Kelley | 54 |
| The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman | 64 |
| Jerrold Mark Dion | 67 |
| Thomas V. Cash | 75 |
| Dwight A. Ink | 87 |
| Submissions for the record: | |
| State Department response to committee request | 104 |
| Response to request by Congressman Traficant | 106 |

# NARCOTICS CONTROL IN MEXICO

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1987

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL,
*Washington, DC.*

The select committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in room B-352, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Charles B. Rangel [chairman of the select committee] presiding.

Present: Representatives Charles B. Rangel, James H. Scheuer, Frank J. Guarini, Solomon P. Ortiz, Edolphus Towns, James A. Traficant, Jr., Benjamin A. Gilman, Lawrence Coughlin, Michael G. Oxley, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., and Tom Lewis.

Staff Present: Mr. Edward H. Jurith, staff director; Mr. Elliott A. Brown, minority staff director; Mr. George Gilbert, counsel; Mr. James W. Lawrence, professional staff; Mr. John S.V. Brown, investigator; Ms. Heide Haberlandt, staff assistant; and Mr. John T. Cusack, consultant.

Mr. RANGEL. Recently, Congressman Benjamin Gilman and I had an opportunity to talk with some of our colleagues from the Mexican Congress about the crisis that the nations—our nations are facing with the explosion of drug production, as well as drug trafficking, and it is our belief on this committee that we can't possible find a solution to this problem until we can get some handle as to what is the definition of the problem and what are we doing about it?

That is the reason why we have asked representatives from the executive branch to share with us the amount of drugs that is being produced in Mexico, that is opium and marijuana, the amount that is being processed, the amount of cocaine that is being transshipped into the United States, the amount that is being interdicted, whether or not annually, there has been a sharp increase; is it a threat to our Nation's security and the security of the people in Mexico?

Has there been an increase in corruption? Has this affected the ability of our great countries to deal with the evergrowing and powerful drug trafficking community? And what does it mean to the security of democracies around this world, and especially in this hemisphere.

But I suspect that the bottom line has to come from the witnesses today—is, do we have a plan? Do we have a plan? What is that plan? Are there goals and timetables? And what is it that the American Government should expect, not just from the Government of Mexico, but a more important issue, from our own Government.

To help us to bring this into focus, we are asking that arm of the U.S. Congress, the General Accounting Office, to give us a broad and international view of the recent investigation that they conducted in Mexico.

And then after that, we hope to hear from a panel—from the administration, from the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, from the Drug Enforcement Administration, and also from the Agency for International Development to answer some of the questions I have made in my opening statement.

There are several leadership meetings being held this morning as to Congress' attempts to wrap up its legislative attempts before the recess, and Members will be joining us, but I thought in the interest of time, and since I am a member of the reconciliation budget conference, that we would get started.

[The opening statement of Chairman Rangel appears on p. 45.]

Is Mr. Joseph Kelley with us? Mr. Kelley is the Associate Director of National Security and International Affairs of the GAO, and he is going to be accompanied by Mr. Thomas Brogan, the Group Director, and Mrs. Dianne Rawl.

We know that—first, let me say for the record that the Congress is fortunate to have the high caliber of professionals that we do with your office, and have you completed your report yet, or is that still being worked on?

Mr. KELLEY. We are still working on it, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Do you have a timetable as to when you——

Mr. KELLEY. We are hoping within the next few months to have it finished. We have to go to the State Department for comments, but after that, another month or two.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, thank you, Mr. Kelley. And I want you to know that your full statement will be in the record, that Mr. Brogan and Ms. Rawl have been very—have both been very, very helpful to our Select Narcotics Committee. You should be proud of your associates, and I am certain when you finish your testimony, we will be proud of you.

Mr. KELLEY. I would like to briefly summarize, if I could, sir?

Mr. RANGEL. Your full statement, without objection, will be in the record. The Chair recognizes Mr. Solomon Ortiz, a strong member of the committee, and I would like to say for the record that when we visit your part of the town, it is kind of hard to find that border that separates us, but it proves the friendship that we have, because we have so many economic and cultural ties.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to include an opening statement for the record.

Mr. RANGEL. Without objection.

[The statement of Mr. Ortiz appears on p. 50.]

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, sir.

We appreciate this opportunity to discuss our views on the United States-Mexico Aerial Opium Poppy and Marijuana Crop Eradication Program. We reviewed the Aerial Eradication Program in accordance with section 2007 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which requires GAO to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. international narcotics control assistance provided pursuant to the

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. We expect to issue a report on our review in the near future.

As you are aware, the U.S. Department of State and the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico have been long-term partners in a program to destroy opium poppy and marijuana fields in Mexico with herbicides sprayed from aircraft.

U.S. appropriations for this program since 1977 exceed $150 million. The United States allocated $15.5 million for fiscal year 1987, $10.55 million of which will cover the cost of aircraft spare parts and maintenance services under a contract between the Attorney General's Office and a U.S. firm. United States officials in Mexico reported that Mexico's 1987 appropriation will exceed $18 million.

We reviewed the Joint Aerial Eradication Program to determine: One, the extent to which the program has, over time, reduced the amount of heroin and marijuana which is produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States.

Two, whether the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico is using United States-purchased and maintained aircraft in a manner which maximizes aerial spraying of opium poppy and marijuana fields.

And, three, whether the program's formal bilateral agreements provide an adequate basis for the ongoing cooperation needed to eliminate opium poppy and marijuana cultivation in Mexico, as quickly and efficiently as possible.

Our review did not cover other bilateral narcotics control activities such as investigations or interdiction, nor did we review other Mexican efforts to limit production and trafficking of dangerous drugs or conversion and transiting of cocaine.

Although the current flow of heroin from Mexico is significantly less than during the mid-1970's, it has steadily increased in recent years. The Department of State reported that in 1986 between 2 and 4 metric tons of heroin reaching the United States originated in Mexico and that, although the bilateral program eradicated more opium poppy and marijuana in 1986 than during the preceding year, it did not keep pace with increases in cultivation.

Annual cultivation and eradication statistics are inexact; however, they do show that typically less than 40 percent of the total estimated annual cultivation of opium poppy and marijuana has been eradicated by the bilateral program.

We identified several problems with the management of the program which, if addressed, should improve program performance.

For example, we found inefficient management of personnel and resources. The program's pilots and mechanics are underpaid in relation to salaries in private industry and as a result, there is a high vacancy rate for pilots and an insufficient number of mechanics, both of which affect aircraft utilization and availability.

Program aircraft did not meet utilization and availability standards recommended by the Department of State. Poor maintenance scheduling and inadequate inventory management caused delays in the maintenance operation, which lengthened the time aircraft spent on the ground for routine inspection and repair. At the same time, the inventory contained excess parts, valued at from $6 to $8 million.

Insufficient program data exists for planning and evaluation purposes. The program lacks countrywide surveys to determine the extent and location of cultivation. In 1986, only two of 13 zones were surveyed.

Eradication estimates are inexact and the verification program is limited, because it has not been provided the helicopter it needs for onground evaluations.

Inventory data is not collected in a manner which facilitates its use for maintenance scheduling, procurement forecasting or maintenance evaluations.

Program evaluations have not been regularly scheduled.

In addition to operational problems which reduce the effectiveness of the current air fleet, broader issues require bilateral attention. For example, we found that the formal agreements between the United States and Mexico, which should document mutual understandings and expectations, do not address important program elements. Specifically, recent agreements do not address the methodology for aerial surveys; include mutually acceptable eradication targets based upon preagreed standards for aircraft utilization and availability; provide for a mutually acceptable and fully equipped program to measure and verify eradication accomplishments; and provide for a mutually acceptable program of periodic evaluation and audit.

This concludes my summary, Mr. Chairman. We will be happy to respond to any questions you or the committee members may have.

[The statement of Mr. Kelley appears on p. 54.]

Mr. RANGEL. While I hope that you will make yourself available this morning after the Government testifies, but if I understand your testimony, that you are saying that there has been a sharp increase in the amount of drugs that are produced and exported into the United States.

Mr. KELLEY. Steady increase.

Mr. RANGEL. You are saying that the eradication program is ineffective.

Mr. KELLEY. Not working as I think both parties would expect.

Mr. RANGEL. You are saying that the data available is unreliable as relates to the amount of crops that are being eradicated.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir. We are saying, the data could be strengthened, if the program had better surveys.

Mr. RANGEL. When you make all these observations and reach these conclusions, on what plan, on what document are you working from? In other words, we have been working with the Government of Mexico for 20 or 30 years on this problem.

What plan are you working from in order to determine what moneys are needed, what is being done with the money, whether there are goals and objectives? What is the USGOM plan that you are working from?

Mr. KELLEY. Well, sir, when we were in Mexico, the Embassy was working on an operational plan. I understand it was completed in mid-May. It represents the Embassy's view of what is needed to try to improve the program.

Prior to that, as best I can tell there was no formal plan.

Mr. RANGEL. Now, listen. I want to assume that we are working with one government. Now, you talked about the Embassy plan.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Now, is there a State Department plan or a Narcotics Division plan or an Inter-American plan or——

Mr. KELLEY. Best I can tell, the only plan that we saw is the Embassy plan that was prepared and completed in May. The State Bureau for International Narcotics Matters has issued policy guidance for the various countries around the world, in March, I believe. It contains general policy guidance for each country, Mexico included and covers some of the things that I mentioned need attention.

Mr. RANGEL. Now, the March plan, that is the annual report. That is the public plan that the State Department released.

Mr. KELLEY. Well——

Mr. RANGEL [continuing]. Strategy.

Mr. KELLEY [continuing]. A policy guidance, yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. But hardly a work sheet——

Mr. KELLEY. It is a very general document, but it does capture the kinds of things we felt they needed to focus on. The only plan that we have seen is this operational plan prepared by the Embassy for the Ambassador.

As far as we know, it still has not been approved within the State Department.

Mr. RANGEL. How long was the Ambassador appointed to Mexico?

Mr. KELLEY. How long ago, sir?

Mr. RANGEL. Yeah.

Mr. KELLEY. Last fall, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. And when did you start your investigation?

Mr. KELLEY. We started the investigation in January—actually December, but we went into the country in February and March.

Mr. RANGEL. How long has the Ambassador had this plan?

Mr. KELLEY. As I understand, when we were in the country, they were working on it. They were getting organized and getting their different viewpoints together.

Mr. RANGEL. What plan did we have before this new Ambassador started working on this new plan?

Mr. KELLEY. The Department of State had the JNCSR.

Mr. RANGEL. What what?

Mr. KELLEY. The Department of State document, the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

Mr. RANGEL. Now, you have said, Mr. Kelley, and we don't want to embarrass anyone, this does not raise itself to the level of being a plan. In other words, this is just an overall strategy in fighting this problem in all parts of the world.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. So, you could not take this strategy and ask anyone how we are doing with plan, could you?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir. Generally, it is a policy guidance that tries to set some general goals, but does not have any specific——

Mr. RANGEL. Very good. We won't call it a plan. Just call it a broad strategy very well written, but to your knowledge, there was no plan in operation until this new Ambassador started developing the plan, and he did that during the course of your investigation?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Now, do you know whether—do you know the status of our Ambassador's plan in Mexico?

Mr. KELLEY. As I understand it, sir, it has been submitted to Washington to the Bureau. As far as we know, it has not yet been approved. There is no formal arrangement with the Government of Mexico, as I understand, on that plan as yet.

Mr. RANGEL. So, if I understand your testimony correctly, and it may not be accurate, but at least you are testifying that to your knowledge, there was no plan in effect between our Government and the Government of Mexico before the new Ambassador—and notwithstanding the fact that he is working on the document, there is no plan in effect now.

Mr. KELLEY. That is my understanding, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. And the situation is worse now than it has ever been in terms of the drugs coming into the United States?

Mr. KELLEY. It's more than it was a few years ago.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Gilman, I explained—I want to welcome Frank Guarini, who is with us from the CBI. Jim Scheuer has joined with us and, of course, Ben Gilman and Jim Sensenbrenner is with us, and we have only taken the testimony of the General Accounting Office, and I have concluded my inquiry.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to welcome our distinguished panelists at today's hearing and hope they will be able to more fully inform us of how we can improve our working relationship between the United States and Mexico to try to combat illicit production, the drug trafficking and consumption of drugs.

It is jeopardizing the health not only of our own citizens, but the citizens of Mexico and the entire world. During the late 1970's and early 1980's, Mexico had developed what we felt was a very effective narcotics control program, one that we held out as a model to the entire world, a program we had urged other drug-producing nations to try to emulate.

However, during the past few years, unfortunately, efforts to combat illicit production and trafficking in drugs has seriously deteriorated. Why it has gone downhill, we are not too sure, partly due to the increased effectiveness of the drug producers and traffickers and partly, I guess, due to the corruption on both sides of the border, and I guess partly due to laxness on the part of both governments.

This hearing isn't intended to be a bashing of any governmental agency, either in Mexico or in the United States, but to try to find where the problems lie. It is intended to try to get our narcotics control programs back on the right track, to try to improve our efforts to jointly combat this problem that is affecting both of our Nations and affecting so many other nations.

I don't think it serves any useful purpose that either Mexico or the United States try to find fault with one another, waging war against the drug traffickers, against the international crime syndicates who control the drug trafficking.

Furthermore, we in our Nation need to put our own house in order before we point the finger at any other nation, and we are here today to find out how we can improve our own programs.

Combating drug trafficking is a continual battle and in that regard we do need Mexico's assistance and their cooperation, and it is in their interest and our interest for both nations to work closely together to be constructive in working out an effective joint policy.

I would hope that our distinguished witnesses from the General Accounting Office and the State Department today, the DEA, and the Agency for International Development will help us in developing more effective, more constructive programs that will lead to greater cooperation, to better coordination of all of our work and efforts in the utilization of the limited funds that are available to apply to this effort.

I would hope, too, as a delegate to the recently completed 27th Inter-Parliamentary Conference, along with our distinguished chairman, Mr. Rangel, that the delegations of both nations who had supported a number of important recommendations, will soon see the implementation of the United States-Mexico Commission that we called for in the 1986 Anti-Drug Act, and also to see an agreement to work to adjust and update legislation to prevent and penalize illegal drug actions and to exchange all relevant documents between our two countries on legislative initiatives, try to find agreement to seek educational measures, to reduce the consumption of drugs, and I hope, too, that our joint efforts will lead to developing a cooperative, constructive regional approach to our drug problems and efforts to find a speedy final gratification of the pending mutual legal assistance treaty, and to affirm the need for a commission to seek the solution to many of these problems.

[The opening statement of Mr. Gilman appears on p. 64.]

Mr. GILMAN. Now, if I might, I just have a few questions, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask you, what do you believe are the primary reasons why the Mexican eradication program has failed to reduce a flow of illicit drugs to our Nation? What do you think is the underlying cause, having reviewed all of the efforts in the last few months?

Mr. KELLEY. Probably several reasons, sir. I think one is fairly obvious; cultivation, as I stated in my statement, has increased ahead of eradication efforts. So in one sense, cultivation is increasing and eradication is not keeping up with it.

We think the economy in Mexico has encouraged the farmers to go into this business, more than they would have otherwise. Because the economy of the country has suffered the last several years, it is more opportunistic for them to get into that business.

Also, I think the management problems that I mentioned in my statement have contributed to the inefficiencies of the use of the aircraft and the aerial spraying activities. Important also, is the need for mutually agreeable goals and targets between the United States and the Mexican Government.

I think you need to set out what is expected to be eradicated. Without mutual goals and objectives I think you have a problem getting management control.

Mr. GILMAN. With regard to targets, do we have an accurate assessment what is out there?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. What are we doing about that?

Mr. KELLEY. In 1986, they surveyed in two different States—zones. The Embassy is working with a United States contractor to try to give the Government of Mexico, the PGR, some capability for aerial survey. They have plans to modify an aircraft. They are contracting with a firm to mount a camera. So, they are moving to try to get on top——

Mr. GILMAN. So, all this time, we really haven't had an accurate survey of just how much product is being grown.

Mr. KELLEY. That is my understanding.

Mr. GILMAN. But, you do think the new methods will be able to accomplish that kind of accurate assessment?

Mr. KELLEY. If both governments can come to a mutual agreement on the methodology they should use for the surveys and agree on the coverage they need to get, it should give them a starting point to know what kind of problem they are dealing with.

With that information, they can better program the use of the aircraft and come up with standards as to how many——

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Kelley if I might interrupt. Do we have the technology to accomplish what we are seeking?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. All a matter of agreeing for the two nations to go out and get——

Mr. KELLEY. Plus the resources you need to do it.

Mr. GILMAN. Now it is my understanding it is a new agreement that is involved with maintenance that has been a big problem. They have not been able to utilize the aircraft they have, and we are now bringing about a new agreement that should accomplish what we have been seeking to do to have more effective maintenance, is that correct?

Mr. KELLEY. Well, my understanding, the State Department is evaluating the maintenance problem. They haven't really, as far as I can understand, reached a decision on what that maintenance situation should be or how——

Mr. GILMAN. My understanding is that our United States Ambassador to Mexico, Mr. Lloyd, has already prepared a new agreement and one is being looked over. Are you aware of that?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir, I am not aware of that.

Mr. GILMAN. There have been some problems with regard to verification of just how much eradication has been underway. Is that still a problem and if it is, what are we doing to correct it?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir, it is our understanding it continues to be a problem. There is Project Vanguard which was set up to get at this problem. But, and I think the Embassy as well as the State Department would agree, it doesn't have the onground capability to verify what is actually happening. They are using fixed-wing aircraft to make their observations, and cannot come down to perform what they call "ground-truthing". They need a helicopter to do that, and there has been a hangup, in making one available.

Mr. GILMAN. Going back to my question with regard to maintenance, I think you indicated you were aware of the Narcotics Control operations plan that was being prepared by the Embassy in Mexico dated May 15, 1987. Are you not?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Doesn't that have to do with maintenance? I have a copy here. The executive summary says the plan focused principally on the aerial eradicating program and suggests ways to improve use of current resources including the maintenance aspect.

Mr. KELLEY. Excuse me sir, I misunderstood your point—that the operational plan does have a provision in there for trying to get at the maintenance problems——

Mr. GILMAN. Have you looked this over?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir, I have.

Mr. GILMAN. You have looked it over?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you think it will accomplish what has to be done with regard to correcting the maintenance problem?

Mr. KELLEY. I don't know if I can make a categorical statement, but I think it is a step in the right direction. As I understand sir, it has not been formally presented to the Mexican Government. It is still here in Washington being approved.

Mr. GILMAN. What is holding it up? It is dated May 1987. We are now into May, June, July, August. How much longer do we have to wait to present it to the Mexicans?

Mr. KELLEY. I can't answer that.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you know why it is being held up?

Mr. KELLEY. No, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Ms. Rawl? Ms. Rawl would like to comment on where it stands.

Ms. RAWL. I was going to say that a copy of a plan was provided to the attorney general's office.

Mr. GILMAN. To our Attorney General's Office?

Ms. RAWL. To the Mexican——

Mr. GILMAN. Has any comment come back from them, do you know?

Ms. RAWL. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. GILMAN. Well, I guess our witnesses a little later on will be able to clarify——

Mr. KELLEY. As we understand it is still in the State Department being reviewed, but that is the best information I have.

Mr. GILMAN. Based on your survey, does Mexico now have the aerial capability to do the kind of eradication we would like them to do to destroy the crop?

Mr. KELLEY. The answer to that question, sir, goes back to trying to identify the magnitude of the problem. We know the assets they have there, but before anybody can say these are sufficient assets to do the job, they have to define the job they need to do and agree on it. Then work out——

Mr. GILMAN. How long will it take us to find out what has to be done?

Mr. KELLEY. I think you have to figure out how long the surveys are going to take, if they agree——

Mr. GILMAN. What do you estimate it at?

Mr. KELLEY. I really can't estimate that.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Is anyone seeking to make inquiry of the General Accounting Office? Mr. Scheuer?

Mr. SCHEUER. Just very briefly this plan you are speaking of, I wonder what are its sources, where are the roots? Where did the Ambassador go to seek expert information? Did he check with the—DEA? Did he check with the Justice Department? Did he check with the INS? The border patrol? Where did he go for expert information in putting together that plan?

Mr. KELLEY. As I understand it, Mr. Congressman, advice came from within the Embassy, from the experts working on the country team. They may have consulted their agencies in Washington, but I can't say that for a fact. As I understand it, basically, there plan was developed from the input within the Embassy, from DEA and various organizations there.

Mr. SCHEUER. There is always a tendency on the part of a new group coming into town, sort of reinventing the wheel, and coming up with a new fashioned genius that will get all of their heads and shoulders in sculpture in the hall of fame, but there is a continuum of ideas and expertise. A great deal of it lies in the Federal agencies here in Washington and State and city officials too, and law enforcement officials all over the United States, and we try to keep our lines out in this committee, all of us, formal and informal contacts all over the place, especially in the Federal Establishment that deals with this matter, the agency mentioned to you, and as I have talked to staff and other members, they haven't heard of any of these Federal agencies being contacted, being—so, also instead for advice, information, and counsel about how to put together a program. I wonder how serious a program it can be if they never tapped any of the Federal resources or any of the other informal and formal points of expertise in this country and just sort of pasted together something from within the Embassy personnel in Mexico City.

Mr. KELLEY. I can't answer whether they checked with people here in town. We looked at the plan——

Mr. SCHEUER. You don't know whether they checked with any of the Federal agencies that are involved?

Mr. KELLEY. Here in Washington, I don't know. They definitely had the input of the experts in the Embassy.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GUARINI. Mr. Chairman, this is really very frustrating because it seems to be another classic case of spinning our wheels. Mexicans are always friendly, they are always receptive. Nothing is ever done. We can talk and talk and talk but there is no political will to do what is right. This has been going on for 30 years, will go on for another 30 years. A piece of paper doesn't make a damn bit of difference if they don't have the desire to clean up their own house, and no matter how many trips we take down there, no matter how many discussions and mutual treaties we try to make, we are ending up in the same place.

It is terribly frustrating and there has to be a new approach because the approach we are on is just taking us down the same path we have been on for many decades and leading us nowhere. Can I ask you whether or not there is any recommendations you have got that, Mr. Kelley, can be pursued or any creative thinking that GAO can come up with?

Mr. KELLEY. I believe that what we see needs to be done is probably not all that original. It is just a matter of trying to get the two governments together to come to some understanding as to the goals we are really shooting toward and, more specifically, how this program should work. These are some of the things I mentioned in my statement. There should be some improvements and I think we can make some recommendations with respect to the maintenance. But, those are the two areas——

Mr. GUARINI. With all the basic corruption that is lying under the power of narcotic money, it really just seems to be a hopeless situation, just wishful thinking.

Thank you.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the things I would like to ask in your statement, the United States allocated $15.5 million for fiscal year 1987, and $10.55 million to cover the cost of aircraft spare parts and maintenance service. Now you go on down and say that Mexico's input appropriations exceed $18 million.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. ORTIZ. Could you dissect that and tell me how Mexico is—how are they going to use or spend the $18 million. Is it manpower or how?

Mr. KELLEY. It is our understanding it is primarily manpower and facilities. They have about 500 people in this program.

Mr. ORTIZ. So when we give them money and they are going to appropriate so much money, we reach an agreement as to how they spend that money or how they are going to utilize the money they will appropriate, am I correct?

Mr. KELLEY. That is one of the problems. I don't know if the Department of State reached that agreement, but that is basically how Mexico spends its funds. They support the facilities and payroll, more or less, and the United States supports the aircraft and provides the aircraft and——

Mr. ORTIZ. One of the reasons I ask this question is because in April of this year the Armed Services Committee of which I am a member, we had a delegation of about 8-9 members, and you know the committee was impressed because of what—Guarini says what they told us and they told us they had assigned many times up to 30,000 soldiers eradicating this marijuana and poppy fields and so on and so forth, and one of the problems they have is they didn't have sufficient money.

They have a small military force and then about 30 percent—not 30, or maybe more are used—eradicating poppy fields and marijuana fields and trafficking concerns and all that, but it seems to many that the years are the same—the same States are involved over and over and over again.

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. ORTIZ. So—I am just like Mr. Guarini. I am at a loss. I mean there is a method of operation, we know who they are, we know what States are involved.

Another question I would like to ask and maybe you can respond is, sometime back about a couple of years back when we had the killing of the agent down there, there was a lot of clamor by the Mexican newspapers that our DEA agents there were there evilly

and they were intruding, but this is not the feeling that I receive and I get by talking to Mexican officials. They want to work with them. They appreciate the efforts that we do in working with them.

Have you noticed any change in that? They want—they still want DEA to work in Mexico or they want them out or——

Mr. KELLEY. We didn't really examine that issue in the review, insofar as the Mexican Government attitudes or feelings with respect to the DEA presence. We strictly looked at the aerial eradications program. We met the Deputy Attorney General, and had a cordial meeting with him. He was very open in his discussions of his interests.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you. I don't have any further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Anyone else? The Chair welcomes Laurie Covlin joining the panel. Our next panel is going to be——

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I can? Mr. Chairman, just briefly, I notice in the last part of your report summary that—I quote, "We discussed many of our actions with the U.S. Ambassador and other U.S. officials while in Mexico and they appeared receptive." Receptive to what? Receptive to the report?

Mr. KELLEY. Receptive to the problems—we pointed out to them; the things we think need to be done to make the program more effective. They didn't just throw up their hands and disagree with us. They agreed these things need to be fixed, and that there are some problems. In fact, the operational plan we have been talking about tries to get at some of the problems mentioned in my statement.

Mr. OXLEY. And particularly you relate to formal agreements with Mexico which should contain eradication goals and so forth. Is that what you are referring to?

Mr. KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Any other member of the panel seeking recognition? Let me thank you for your testimony, thank you for the work you have done.

To let you know that we are depending on you, we hope that you don't have as long a life in your investigation as this select committee has been forced to have, but we are looking forward to your report and if you can be kind enough to stay around for a month, perhaps you can help us with some of the answers that we expect from the panel.

Thank you.

Mr. KELLEY. Thank you, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. We are pleased to have with us members representing the administration from the Secretary of State, Mr. Mark Dion, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, and also from the Secretary of State, the Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. Paul Taylor. From the DEA, Assistant Administrator for Operations, Mr. Thomas Cash, and also we have Mr. Dwight Ink, from the Bureau of Latin American Affairs, Agency for International Development, Department of State.

Let me thank this panel for being with us this morning and a very special thanks to Mr. Paul Taylor who, because of some problem probably which originated on our side, he was under the im-

pression that his agency would not require a witness. We know that our—my conversation with you was after 5:00 p.m. and you were not expected to prepare any written testimony. As a matter of fact, for all of the witnesses, I would want you to know that your prepared testimony, if there is no objection from this panel, will appear in the record, and the major reason why this committee wanted all of the representatives in the different agencies and departments is because we are just as anxious to find out what our policy is as we are to find out what our plans are.

[The prepared statements of Mr. Dion, p. 67; Mr. Cash, p. 75; and Mr. Ink, p. 87; appear at the end of the hearing record.]

It is my understanding, especially by the members like Mr. Ortiz who represent border communities, that the people in Mexico are really going through some severe economic pains and as a result of the market falling out of oil, under development of infrastructure, increase of problems in morale and corruption within the Government, that we find a situation which, unfortunately, a growing antisentiment is being created and as a result of the enactment of our recent immigration laws, we expect that some major problems are going to occur as we see families being torn apart.

Now, we are not just talking about some foreign government. We are talking about a neighboring community that as I said earlier that we can't even find the line that guides us culturally in the States and yet we have just had testimony this morning that this country has stepped up its production not only in opium and marijuana, but it is now becoming one of the major sources of transshipment of cocaine Mexico is not involved in toiling in terms of production of cocoa leaf or processing, but it is a major source of cocaine coming into the country.

And then when we ask, what plan do we have, the General Accounting Office says to us this morning, we don't have any plan, that we had a strategy which the State Department has talked about—every year we issue a strategy but that our good Ambassador, that beneficial man I have had the privilege of meeting and working with, is in the process now of working out something, and even that is not a plan, that we are asked by our colleagues to meet with our counterparts in the Mexican Congress. We don't have a document to work from in terms of what is being accomplished on our side. We don't even know according to everybody that we have talked with whether there is anybody in these two great governments that even understands the depth of the problem that we are faced with, so that we would find out what to do at some time in the future, I assume, to handle it.

And even on top of all of this ignorance, and my fear that if the Communists are taking over Nicaragua, Grenada, and Central America, that what a fertile place to go that a community that looks to its rich neighbors to the north and finds out we always appear to be beating up on them, but here we have no weapons to defend ourselves because now the Attorney General of Mexico tells us that over half of the annual budget is being used to fight this problem.

And yet there is no plan that he has with us. He told us that he has about 15 helicopters. We don't know what they are going to do with them, but we say that is a nice effort because we try to act

like State Department people and say that is nice what you are doing, but we don't have any worksheet to say, yes, but.

And then to add insult to injury, while our country sends us down there to Mexico thanking them for "their cooperation", the Mexican President calls the United States drug problem out of control. He says that our appetite for drugs has now caused them problems. You know so we now have to apologize for being, as he said, self-indulgent. Now we read that some $15 or $20 million of taxpayer money is going down there to help with our problem, but I can think of a lot of better reasons for us to use this money if, indeed, it is a U.S. problem.

Then perhaps we ought to use some of this money in reducing demand. But I don't know of any U.S. program to do that. And then I say—that while I and this committee finds it is frustrated and not even knowing the depth of the problem, that our United States Ambassador is now congratulating the Mexican Government for the great work they are doing. So, if I sound confused, I have not even snatched the statements of love and affection and deep respect that our mutual attorneys general have for each other.

I mean there is no height to the cooperation that attorneys general can have when they meet, but I don't know what they are meeting about if, indeed, there is no plan, no assessment and the only thing we got is some recommendations in the form of a plan coming from our Ambassador and that lies someplace in the State Department.

So I am anxious to find out what is the plan, what is the depth of the problem, what are we doing about it, what is this cooperation and give this committee something that we can use as realistic goals and objectives so when some of us get caught on the other side of the border trying to protect our interests, that we have some guidelines to go by rather than the statements of the Attorney General of our country, the Ambassador of our country applauded them for all they are doing and then in return what we get is being kicked in the teeth by the Mexican President for him saying that our United States problem is out of control.

So, maybe you can help me with this, and perhaps we would start not as we have it listed here, but from Mr. Taylor because I assume that our policy with Mexico is broader than just a narcotic problem. And is there—does it represent a potential source for Communist infiltration? Is there economy in trouble or do they have debt problems, high unemployment, poverty? Are we working with them to rebuild the country and what is our narcotic plan as it relates to our overall foreign policy?

Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, indeed, we do have a wide range of interests in our relationship with Mexico. You have alluded to many of them already. I would reiterate some of the things you have said in answering your question.

First of all, we look to Mexico as one of the neighbors with which we have a contiguous land border. It is a neighbor with whom we would like to have good, friendly and constructive relations. We do have an enormous amount of interchange with the country of Mexico. We feel strongly that it is in our interest for Mexico to have a strong vital and effective, democratic political system.

We think also that the economic viability of Mexico is a matter of interest to us. We have, for example, a trade relationship with Mexico which is third in the world when it comes to our bilateral trade. We are by far the largest export market for Mexican products that are traded internationally.

There is an important investor presence of United States-based firms in Mexico and not only in the industry along the border, but other types of direct investment by American firms as well. Tourism is another part of our economic relationship with literally millions of tourists traveling back and forth every year between our countries.

The narcotics issue, of course, is an important part of this relationship. The statistics on trade in narcotics, that is to say narcotics coming into the United States from Mexico have already been cited. I won't rehearse those again, but in fact, we are working together to try to support Mexican efforts to try to contribute what we can to bringing narcotics production in Mexico under control and to curtailing narcotics exports to the United States, both from those produced in Mexico and those transshipped through Mexico from other sources.

Of course, as you have already mentioned, the immigration issue is an important additional element in the relationship. The Congress recently enacted landmark immigration legislation. We are consulting with the Mexican Government on implementation of the new law. Our approach is to ensure that legitimate cross-border traffic continues unimpeded while simultaneously halting the flow of those individuals who lack the proper documentation to enter the United States.

In short, there is a very broad set of intertwined interests which give shape to our overall relationship with Mexico. There is no question at all, but that narcotics is high on the list of our bilateral concerns.

Mr. RANGEL. Well, that is an eloquent statement, Mr. Taylor. I would assume that all of these issues are important and that the question of narcotics has to elevate itself as to a priority foreign policy issue rather than just law enforcement.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Now, why is it that at my age I can't recall any public statements as to the importance of getting a handle on this international problem by our Secretary of State? What is it that I am missing as I watch him attentively week after week eloquently speak out against Communists and terrorism and all of these things that we believe in, why is it that I always miss the speeches that he has given about how important it is in foreign policy for us to break the backs of these international drug traffickers?

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I have a hard time addressing the question as asked. The fact is the Secretary of State has repeatedly emphasized his concern, with the problem or narcotics.

Mr. RANGEL. Good. I always ask this question and your staff should have briefed you. Could you tell us any dates at all in the last 6 years that the Secretary of State publicly has said what you have just said so eloquently, that in order to protect our friendship and to get going on tackling this problem that our State Depart-

ment is on top of this? Could you tell me when publicly this has been done?

Mr. TAYLOR. The Secretary has mentioned this concern of his in budget submissions——

Mr. RANGEL. I'm not talking about to his political family or to the administration. I am talking about the United States of America and the free world.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, my reference was to committees of the Congress.

Mr. RANGEL. No, no, no. Don't count us. I am talking on television, when he is out there, when he is riding the point and get all the help you can from anybody and this is the question I ask every time I get a hold of you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, I can endeavor to provide for the record such dates.

[The information referred to appears on p. 104.]

Mr. RANGEL. You are not going to do it, but tell the Secretary I asked again because I think it is important that the American people recognize as former Chief Justice of the United States Warren Burger did, that this in his opinion was a more serious threat to our national security than communism. You can fight communism all you want. I always say I haven't lost a kid in my district to communism, but that is another problem. I think we should get it up here.

Now, my last question, Mr. Taylor, is knowing—and I do believe that the Secretary believes that this is an essential problem in our foreign policy throughout the world and especially with Mexico—why don't you shatter the myth that the General Accounting Office gave to this committee and tell us that it just ain't so that we don't have a plan to deal with this problem with the Government of Mexico?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, sir, my colleagues have more primary responsibility for narcotics programs, but since you asked me, I will say that there have been policy statements over and over again that have articulated the continuing program that we have with Mexico.

Mr. RANGEL. What program?

Mr. TAYLOR. Assistance through the Bureau of Narcotics, International Narcotics matters.

Mr. RANGEL. How much money?

Mr. TAYLOR. This year the budget is $14.5 million.

Mr. RANGEL. To do what?

Mr. TAYLOR. To work on eradication.

Mr. RANGEL. How would the money be spent?

Mr. TAYLOR. May I defer to my colleague who has responsibility for narcotics programs?

Mr. RANGEL. I am not here to embarrass you, but Assistant Secretary Ann Wrobleski is doing a fantastic job. But I am trying to get foreign policy. I am trying to get not just what she does in drugs. I am trying to find out what my Government feels about it and I do hope that the Secretary should be able to say that we have a friendship with the Government of Mexico, we have a plan, a mutual plan to deal with it, and that the moneys that are being used, what they are using, what we are using, that there is a time-

table where Members of Congress and the people of both governments are able to gauge our success or failure.

But if I have been involved in this all of my adult life, and we are saying at this date that our recently appointed Ambassador is working on a plan which he is submitting to the State Department, Mr. Taylor, that does not sound encouraging.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, the program that has been in effect for some time is to increase the effectiveness of eradication through maintenance services to the end of having——

Mr. RANGEL. Would you agree, Mr. Taylor, that the program has been a disaster?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. Would you say it has been a failure?

Mr. TAYLOR. I would say that the program has had success.

Mr. RANGEL. Would you tell us one success in the last 6 years that we have had with our quote, "program"?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. The eradication rates are up. As stated earlier, the production rates seem to be up even more. All of us have to be modest, though in our conclusions because the data is not as certain as we would like. But if you ask whether I or my colleagues are satisfied that enough is being accomplished, I would have to say not yet.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Secretary, I am not talking about enough. We don't even have a survey to understand how much is being grown there so it doesn't matter how much is being seized there if more and more tons of narcotics are coming across the border. If Customs has agreed that they cannot stop it from seeping across the border, we don't know how much is being grown. We don't know how dependent the Mexican government is on it. We know we have got 15 helicopters. If we thought that it was a threat to our national security, and an ever growing threat, we wouldn't call this a success. We would just say that we haven't given up and then that would be challenged.

But if we don't have a plan, what do you gauge success with? There is no State Department—no U.S. Government, Mexican Government plan. There is no survey. We have just got a good ambassador and good friends in Mexico.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, on that point I would like to add that the Ambassador is doing more than speaking publicly about these issues. As you know, he is negotiating as a matter of very high priority with his host Government in Mexico to try to improve cooperation to the end of increasing the effectiveness of the eradication program.

Mr. RANGEL. He is a good man and I have every confidence in him, but what is he improving upon? He is not the first ambassador we have sent to Mexico. So what is he working from? What document is the Ambassador working from?

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, he with his country team, which includes all of the agencies that have been mentioned this morning, have developed a plan which if implemented would improve our current program and reduce the quantity of drugs entering the United States.

Mr. RANGEL. I spare no adjectives in lauding the efforts of our ambassador to Mexico. My problem is it was my understanding that our ambassadors enforce the policies of the President of the

United States and the Secretary as enunciated by the Secretary of State and we give him the plan and he is to execute that plan and that the State Department reports to us how much money they need in order to support this policy.

Now, of course, if this is difference, where Mexico, together with his country team, develop a plan and then they send it to the Secretary of State and he gets approval by the President, what do I know? But what bothers me is that the ambassador has no plan to work from. No one gave him a plan when he was appointed. If he wasn't working out his own plan, there would be no plan.

We think it is bad. We will open it up for questions.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I address this to all of the panelists. Something that is distressing to those of us who worked on the problem is we have not had an accurate estimate of the total problem we are confronted with in Mexico. Neither the Mexican Government or our Government have been able to develop an accurate estimate of the entire production that is out there. So if we are going to try to attack the problem, what are we working from?

I understand we are about to do some better aerial surveys. Are we finally going, after all these years, going to try to evolve an accurate estimate of the extensiveness of the problem? I address that to the entire panel. Does anyone have any information for us? Do we have an accurate estimate? GAO says we don't. Anyone want to venture? Will someone please come forward and tell us?

Mr. Dion.

Mr. DION. I would like to get into this one when I begin to testify, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. We are testifying now. Let's get into the issue right now, if you would.

Mr. DION. We have been working with the Mexican Government for the last 2 years to devise an aerial survey that would give both governments a set of bench marks of what kind of cultivation is under way in Mexico.

Mr. GILMAN. Two years now. Where do we stand on that?

Mr. DION. We carried out one survey in February of 1987. Excuse me in February of 1986, in the main opium producing region of Mexico, the tristate area, where we anticipate that the bulk of opium production is underway in Mexico. This was done by a private U.S. firm.

Mr. GILMAN. In what region?

Mr. DION. The tristate region, Durango, Sinaloa, and southern Chihuahua. This has been since the 1940's the main area of Mexican opium production. The survey was carried out by a U.S. company, Mark Hurd Systems of Minneapolis, in a contract with the Mexican Government that for the first time allowed foreign pilots to fly over Mexican territory and film this producing area. The film was read by Mexican photo analysts who were trained by our Bureau. And a preliminary estimate was made of the production of opium.

Mr. GILMAN. When was that undertaken?

Mr. DION. In February and March of 1986. The results are in the International Narcotics Strategy Report.

Mr. GILMAN. Cultivation changes from year to year. What have you done in 1987?

Mr. DION. The next effort focused on the need to outfit a Mexican aircraft with photo equipment that would allow the Mexicans to carry out their own analysis of the problem.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Dion, do we have today the capability of doing an accurate estimate of the total production in Mexico?

Mr. DION. We will not have the capability to do an estimate of the total production in Mexico, but we will have the capability to do an estimate of the main areas of production in February of——

Mr. GILMAN. Will there be some future time when we can do the total estimate of the entire production of Mexico?

Mr. DION. We don't have a figure as to how much that would cost, but we anticipate it would be probably in the area of $50, $60 million. What we can do is focus through land set on areas of cultivation that seem to be planted in narcotics crops and then do low-altitude aerial surveys.

Mr. GILMAN. Are you saying to us then we don't project that we are going to be able to do a total estimate of all of the production in Mexico at any time?

Mr. DION. Sir, we will be able to do an estimate of all of the opium production in Mexico, but we will not be able to do an estimate of marijuana production in Mexico.

Mr. GILMAN. When will we be able to do an estimate of the full opium production in Mexico?

Mr. DION. In one year.

Mr. GILMAN. When will that begin?

Mr. DION. The photo interpreters will be trained, aircraft will be equipped, et cetera, by next February. We will have two aircraft for surveys.

Mr. GILMAN. Next February we will be able to undertake for the first time a full aerial survey of narcotics production in Mexico; is that correct?

Mr. DION. We will be able to carry out a survey of the opium producing areas of Mexico. There are about five of them. This is a major undertaking, sir. I assure you this will cost millions of dollars.

Mr. GILMAN. I would hope with all of the millions we are spending in trying to achieve a goal and trying to effect a plan that we have an accurate estimate of what the total goal should be. At this point it has all been projections and estimates based on a hit or miss operation as I review it.

Mr. DION. No, sir, I don't think so. I think we have a pretty good estimate of the production of opium in Mexico.

Mr. GILMAN. What do you say the total production is in Mexico, how many hectares?

Mr. DION. It is in the International Narcotics Survey Report in 1987, 4,000 to 6,000 hectares.

Mr. GILMAN. Is the total production?

Mr. DION. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. How much was eradicated?

Mr. DION. Approximately 35 to 40 percent.

Mr. GILMAN. So we hit about a third of the total production?

Mr. DION. Yes, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Why is it we are not able to take care of the entire production?

Mr. DION. For a number of reasons, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. That is what we are here to find out today. What are they?

Mr. DION. They have to do with problems in the eradication program itself, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. What are the problems that have to be addressed?

Mr. DION. There are a whole variety of them that are recounted in my testimony.

Mr. GILMAN. Will you tell us what those problems are?

Mr. DION. I think the more serious ones concern the availability of pilots, the availability of aircraft, and maintenance of the aircraft.

Mr. GILMAN. Does Mexico need more aircraft than they have at the present time?

Mr. DION. I think we will have to wait to see what the evaluations that are under way produce before we can say whether more aircraft are needed or not.

Mr. GILMAN. Who is evaluating that?

Mr. DION. I would like to get into that, sir, if you will permit me.

Mr. GILMAN. Please get into it. Who is evaluating it?

Mr. DION. There are four different surveys currently under way of the Mexican program. One you have alluded to, you and the chairman on several occasions, is the one that was commissioned by our Ambassador in Mexico and was carried out by his staff. In this I include the Director of the Narcotics Assistance Unit with the help of the other agencies at post in Mexico City. All are part of the country team, the Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. military attaché and so forth, other parts of the country——

Mr. GILMAN. When will you have a full evaluation of this?

Mr. DION. That is one evaluation that has been completed.

Mr. GILMAN. When will you have an evaluation of all of the studies?

Mr. DION. There are several studies under way.

Mr. GILMAN. Will they be coming to you?

Mr. DION. Yes, sir. To our Bureau.

Mr. GILMAN. When do you expect to have a full evaluation of these studies?

Mr. DION. Once we have finished the full report called Evaluations of the Aerial Eradication Program in Mexico, begun in March of this year by Aviation Support, Inc.——

Mr. GILMAN. When do you expect to have an evaluation of all your studies so you can then make a report and recommend what needs to be done?

Mr. DION. We anticipate that it will be ready in the next month or six weeks.

Mr. GILMAN. One other question. I know I am exceeding my time.

Mr. Dion, for several years now we have been trying to get approval for the United States-Mexican Interparliamentary Commission that had been suggested by our Mexican counterparts, suggested by us in two successive interparliamentary meetings, the last one having been conducted in May. For two years now that thing

has been lingering. In the 1986 Anti Drug Abuse Act we adopted legislation that also included a recommendation for this commission and I am searching in my papers for a copy of that. I am sure you are aware of it. I understand that you have finally made some recommendations to the Secretary of State with regard to the commission.

Mr. DION. That is correct, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. Can you tell us what the status is?

Mr. DION. As I understand—I had hoped to be able to deliver the Chairman a copy of the signed letter from the Secretary of State this morning—but it is still waiting to be signed. It is a letter from the Secretary of State following consultations here with the Congress and with the Government of Mexico as well as consultations with the National Drug Policy Board. It recommends that an interparliamentary commission be established.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Dion, it seems that in the letter of submission to the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State's recommendation to the chairman, that we have gotten away from—somewhere have gotten away from the initial intent of the statute. The statute was intended to be a combination of governmental representatives and parliamentary representatives so that there would be an effective coordinating agency between both governments, a coordinating group between both governments.

In the letter by the Secretary of State, the chairman, he is talking about just an interparliamentary conference to permit specific discussion on narcotics issues without any indication of any governmental administrative people being involved in our discussion as being part of the commission. Moreover, he talks about tacking into an annual meeting as part of the interparliamentary meetings and that was not the intent of this resolution that had been adopted in two successive interparliamentary meetings and it was not the intent of the legislation.

I read to you once again the legislation of section 2024 of the Mexican-United States Intergovernmental Commission.

In accordance of negotiations to establish, A. in accordance with the resolution adopted by the 26 Mexico-U.S. Interparliamentary Conference which recommended that the Government of Mexico and the Government of the United States establish a Mexico-United States Intergovernmental Commission on Narcotics and Psychotropic Drug Abuse Control.

The President should address the Secretary of State in conjunction with the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board to enter into negotiations with the Government of Mexico to create such a joint intergovernmental commission. B. Membership. The commission, which should meet semi-annually, should include members of the Mexican Senate, Chamber of Deputies and the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate, to go with members of the executive departments of each government responsible for drug abuse, education, prevention, treatment and law enforcement. C. report to the Congress no later than 90 days after the date of enactment of this act.

The 90 days has certainly been far exceeded as was adopted in October of 1986.

The Secretary of State shall report to the Congress of progress being made in establishing the commission in accordance with this statute.

Why are we deviating from this statute? Why are we now talking about just an interparliamentary conference to meet annually and it be tacked on to the parliamentary commission? Why is there

such foot dragging on our part almost within a month or two after we adopted this 2 years ago, the interparliamentary conference, Mexico, had their people in place and ready to go and we have been urging and pleading with our own State Department to come forward with their recommendation.

Mr. DION. Well, sir, I can only say what I have been advised. The legal authorities in the Department of State and in the Department of Justice as well as the leadership of the Department of State, and following consultations with the Government of Mexico, determined this should be an interparliamentary commission.

Mr. GILMAN. That is not what Mexico is prepared to do, Mr. Dion.

Mr. DION. My understanding is the Mexican Government prefers this model as well, sir.

Mr. GILMAN. I don't know where you are getting that advice from, but I would like to see something in writing from the Mexican Government that says they would prefer just to have a parliamentary group rather than the statutory provision that we have incorporated in the 1986 Anti Drug Act.

Mr. RANGEL. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GILMAN. Be pleased to.

The RANGEL. I don't know what the Mexican Government is up to but I do know what has been signed into law on our side. I have an unsigned letter from the Secretary of State and under what authority has the Secretary of State to do violence to what we passed into law? You have recognized what is being recommended has nothing to do with the law that we passed. I don't see any similarity at all. There is no executive branch. The meeting period is not there. This is a great idea. We have been doing this anyway without any extension of the law.

Mr. DION. My understanding, sir, is that this was very carefully studied and there is no other example of such a mixed commission that involves the executive and legislative branches and that negotiates with foreign governments for the United States.

Mr. RANGEL. If this Congress passes a law which the Secretary of State finds is repugnant to every international principle which he and the President object to it, then you send a note or do something. You get back to the Congress and say this can't work or this exceeds the congressional authority or that this interferes with foreign policy. But to create some cockamamy idea that has nothing to do with anything we were talking about or the law that was passed—and we meet with the Mexicans—they have said they passed their law. You can argue with them all you want about how can the Secretary just create his own idea as to what he wants to do?

Mr. DION. I think the interpretation of the law was that it was in the form of guidance.

Mr. RANGEL. That our law is guidance to the administration?

Mr. DION. Sir, it said that the Secretary of State should give consideration——

Mr. RANGEL. Should, right.

Mr. DION [continuing]. And the decision was made in consultation with the Department of Justice and with the Government of Mexico that an interparliamentary commission, in which the exec-

utive branch played a role to advise, to assist and so on, but it would not be a joint negotiating commission dealing with the Government of Mexico.

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Dion, you should not become an apologist for this. I am certain you had nothing to do with it, but you know, there are certain legislative legal language in part B of section 2024, which has nothing to do with the Mexican Government but everything to do with the U.S. Congress and the President has signed this into law in October. It says the commission which should meet semiannually, should include members of the Mexican State and Chamber of Deputies and the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate to go with the members of executive departments of each government responsible for drug abuse, education, prevention, treatment and law enforcement, and report to the Congress not later than 90 days.

Now whatever the Secretary wants to do, that is a great idea to bring to the Congress, but I want to know why the Secretary has not executed the law that has been signed by the President. This letter, this unsigned letter that I have, has nothing to do with section 2024 except it involves Members of Congress of the Mexican and United States Governments. We have been meeting, as you know, every year anyway. So we didn't need any recommendations from the Secretary of State.

Ben Gilman and I have been there with him as well as other members of the committee. Now, are you telling us that the Secretary of State believes that our law is unenforceable and you have an opinion from the Department of Justice, to Attorney General's office that this is unenforceable?

Mr. DION. Sir, I didn't say that. What I said was that the lawyers in the Department of State and the Department of Justice——

Mr. RANGEL. Are any of them with you today?

Mr. DION. No, sir.

Mr. RANGEL. OK.

I don't want to take the committee's time. Are you a lawyer?

Mr. DION. No, sir, I am not.

Mr. RANGEL. Anybody here a lawyer?

Mr. SCHEUER. Mr. Chairman, would you ask him has the State Department ever communicated by letter or in a hearing their formal objection to this? When the law was under discussion and debate in the Congress, did they ever advise us they thought this was an unacceptable approach and something better should be adopted?

Mr. DION. My understanding, sir, is that there have been consultations on this legislation over the last 6 or 8 months.

Mr. RANGEL. You bet your life. We are working it out and we are pretty close to agreement. That was the consultation. That is all Ben and I ever heard.

Mr. GILMAN. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Dion, the request for more than an annual meeting came from the Mexicans. They felt this was such a critical problem that we should be meeting more regularly. They even suggested quarterly meetings and we tried additionally to talk about semiannually so we could at least get started. It was the Mexican people that had pleaded with us because this is so critical that we should get

together more frequently to try to resolve these problems and here our own Department that has been trying to work out a more cooperative arrangement has been dragging its feet for 2 years. I can't understand the undue delay and would hope that you try to reconcile these problems and bring about finally the creation of a commission.

This isn't just 2 years old. Former Congressman Wolf and I met in the late seventies with the Mexican administration and at that time they were willing to set up a joint commission. Somewhere in the State Department that got buried once again. I don't know what the reluctance is of the State Department to have a cooperative working group between Mexico and the United States to do the kinds of things this committee is seeking to do today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RANGEL. Let me apologize to the members. That will be the end of my questioning. We do have two other witnesses and that ends the questions for Mr. Gilman as well, so the rest of the panel—I would hope AID and DEA would reserve their testimony. It is in the record but we do need you to back up some of the policies and strategies we have of State and the Chair recognizes Mr. Guarini.

Mr. GUARINI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to limit my discussion to what I think is just more or less symbolic of what might be happening between us and Mexico. I would like to go back to an old case, the Camarena case. That case was in March of 1985. That was a horrible case and it shocks our sensibilities. We expected that we would be able to have complete cooperation with the Mexican Government in regard to the prosecution of the people who were responsible. I would like to ask the State Department have we had a reasonable explanation? Is there anything actively being done? It has been over 2 years now since this man, who was a DEA agent, had a hideous death of being buried alive and I ask where are we in our relationships with Mexico in seeing that justice is done?

Mr. DION. Sir, I would say that the Mexican Government is continuing to seek the prosecution of all of the people who were arrested or are still under arrest. The court procedures which seem slow but we know of slow court procedures in the United States—they insist that justice will be done, that the people who perpetrated this horrible crime will be brought to justice. I think that there is no meeting between U.S. and Mexican officials at which this case is not raised. I think the Mexican Government is acutely aware of the feeling within the administration and in the Congress and among the American public about this case.

I can't tell you when it will be resolved, but I am certain that the Mexican Government and the Mexican court system are seized with this case and I assure you we hope to see justice done.

Mr. GUARINI. That is an expression of aspiration and hope. Let me ask you has anybody been indicted? It has been 2 years and 4 or 5 months. We know that Mexico is very much aware of our keen interest in seeing that justice is done, and this has really been on a front burner. Now if there is ever a time to expedite justice, it would be when the whole world is focusing on a particular case. Now, are people being protected? Is there foot dragging? Is Mexico

to be faulted for the manner in which they are proceeding with the case?

Let me say that I was down there and I spoke to the Attorney General and I found out when I was there that they burned some of the evidence, that they burned the clothes. They said they didn't need them. Now, their system of justice might be different than ours, but I don't think in any system of justice you would see the disappearance or the destruction of some of the evidence that would be important in the case. So I am asking what are you doing as far as the State Department is concerned to see that justice is done or is this just symbolic of the typical rhetoric that we are getting from a country who says that they are friendly to us and want to help and work out the problem, but just keep on dragging our feet on this entire drug issue?

Mr. DION. I think the Mexican Government has stated on many occasions that this case will be prosecuted and that those guilty will be brought to justice.

Mr. GUARINI. Have they ever sat down with you? Have you had meetings in which they have showed you what progress was taking place?

Mr. DION. I would have to defer to Mr. Cash of the Drug Enforcement Administration on the specific details of the investigation itself, but in terms of a foreign policy issue—and I think Mr. Taylor will certainly second me—this has been on the front burner from the very start and continues to be. The Mexican Government is well aware——

Mr. GUARINI. So far you have given me principle and statement. What actions has Mexico taken that proves that they are sincere in bringing these high level drug dealers to task?

Mr. DION. Other high level drug dealers?

Mr. GUARINI. The ones involved in this case.

Mr. DION. They are all under arrest. The prosecution is continuing. The case is being heard in the Mexican courts. Sir, I can't say more than that.

Mr. GUARINI. Is there anybody that knows anything about the case? Mr. Cash?

Mr. CASH. Yes, sir, Mr. Guarini. I want to take this opportunity to thank you for your interest in Enrique Camarena as an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration. We are not going to give up on this case. We never will give up. We are heartened by the interest you and the committee have taken.

The answer to the question is there have been a number of arrests of principals involved in the Camarena murder. Two of the principals, of course, are Mr. Fonseca and Mr. Caro-Quintero, both of whom are imprisoned at this time in Mexico, undergoing the judicial trials utilized by the Mexican system.

The two other principals involved——

Mr. SCHEUER [presiding]. Are they being formally tried?

Mr. CASH. Yes, sir. In their procedures they are. They are incarcerated. They work under the Napoleonic code. Once a subject is arrested he is incarcerated. Statements are gathered to prove the guilt or innocence of the defendants and then that is presented to a judge for a final decision. The case has not been presented to a

judge for a final decision, it is not in the hands of the court so far as I know.

The evidence is being gathered by the Mexican Attorney General's office at this time.

Mr. SCHEUER. Will that finding by the judge of guilt or innocence be like an indictment that will subject him to a formal trial?

Mr. CASH. Once that evidence, under the Napoleonic code is presented to the judge and he finds sufficient evidence to convict, then the defendant would be found guilty and sentenced.

Mr. GUARINI. When can we expect a trial?

Mr. CASH. I don't know, Mr. Guarini. I don't have a projection on that.

Mr. GUARINI. Can we sit down with the Mexicans and ask for a time table with their Ministers of Justice? Do we actually find out the basic information we know as to when justice is going to be done?

Mr. CASH. We have asked on every occasion that we meet with the Attorney General. I don't have a time for the trial, but we are not confining our investigation to Mexico, Mr. Guarini. We have had a large and extensive investigation on the United States side which has, we think, some great potential for success. It is an active investigation and I am not allowed to discuss active investigations. However, I can tell you that there is much substance to what we are discovering, and we have had some indictments in the United States, one for perjury. We have proceeded with all deliberate speed and every opportunity we have to proceed in the U.S. district court in this country in the Camarena case.

Mr. GUARINI. Are you satisfied the Mexican Government has given us all the cooperation we are entitled to and that the matter is proceeding on a fast track?

Mr. CASH. Of course I am prejudiced when it comes to investigations concerning DEA agents. I don't think I would ever be satisfied completely until everybody is brought to justice, however, I think there have been a number of efforts made. There have been a number of frustrating times but there certainly is an ongoing effort being made specifically in the United States and it is something we are not likely to forget.

Mr. GUARINI. There is a vote on right now. We have to leave. I thank you. We will adjourn the hearings for about fifteen minutes. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. SCHEUER. The hearing will recommence.

Mr. Dion, I was interested in your colloquy with Congressman Rangel about the decision not to evaluate the joint commission that the Congress established by legislation. I think it is particularly appropriate at this time, after the many weeks of the Iran gate hearings to ask you what is the process by which you decided which of the laws that the Congress passed and the President signs you are going to obey and which of our laws that the Congress passes and the President signs you are going to ignore.

Mr. DION. I don't think this law has been ignored, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, in terms of this joint commission.

Mr. DION. But my understanding, sir, of the statute was that it called upon the Secretary of State in consultation with the Depart-

ment of Justice and the National Drug Policy Board to negotiate with the Mexican Government for a joint commission which would involve members of the executive branch and the Congress in a negotiating commission with the parliament and administration of the Mexican Government, and that this was substituted over a number of months and——

Mr. SCHEUER. What happened at the end of the study?

Mr. DION. Well, this is the letter that has not yet been signed by the Secretary of State, which perhaps an interparliamentary commission in which the executive branch would participate in an advisory status to the members of the Congress.

It is my understanding that the Government of Mexico agrees with this approach.

Mr. SCHEUER. And what is happening now?

Mr. DION. Well, this is the proposal from the Secretary of State to accommodate the statute.

Mr. SCHEUER. To accommodate the statute. Why aren't you simply doing what the statute proposed?

Mr. DION. Well, sir, my understanding is that we don't have the authority to set up a negotiating commission between the Congress of the United States and the Mexican Congress with the executive branches of the United States and Mexican Governments as participants.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Would the chairman yield?

Who has explicitly told you that you do not have the authority to, in fact, proceed with that which has been mandated by law?

Mr. DION. Sir, we have been advised by the lawyers of the Department of State and of the Department of Justice who have been working on this over the last six months or so that this is the approach they want to take, and our Embassy in Mexico City has discussed this with the Mexican Government, and it is the approach they would like to take as well.

Mr. SCHEUER. And they don't want to participate in such a joint commission, intergovernmental commission.

Mr. DION. That is my understanding, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. You have communicated that in writing to the Congressional leadership, Congressman Rangel.

Mr. DION. Sir, the letter is to be signed today. Perhaps it will not be signed by the Secretary of State, but a preliminary copy obviously has been provided to the committee.

Mr. SCHEUER. Seems to be a strange process for a law passed last year for us to be deciding in August of the following year that whether we want to follow the law or not. Almost seems as if Col. Oliver North is your consultant in what laws to follow, what laws to ignore. Is that an unfair statement?

Mr. OXLEY. Yes.

Mr. SCHEUER. Let me give you some feeling of the utter frustration that is felt on both sides of the aisle here that we don't really try and politicize these things. We have been just as critical of prior Democratic administrations as we are of this one. The mistakes of the past have crossed party lines in the executive branch, and our complaints against this Secretary of State on the level of narcotics have been leveled against past Secretaries of State of both parties and against past administrations of both parties.

I happen to think that the current Secretary of State is a man of exceptional character, integrity, ability and high intelligence and education to his job, and in almost all of the years in which he functions, I think he has done a superb job.

In this area he, like other Secretaries of State, have apparently put the problem of drug addiction and the flow of narcotics into our country very way down on the priority list—well down, and there seems to be no national policies at all on drugs. We have seen the inflow of heroine from Mexico increasing inexorably every year, the heroine produced in Mexico. We have seen Mexico now became an important transit country for the transit of cocaine.

We have seen Mexico become an exporter to us from almost nothing in marijuana to the single largest source of marijuana outside of this country. If you go to the mountain top and look at the drug enforcement machinery that exists between our two countries, you almost have the feeling that if we did away with all of it and just let drugs flow freely into this country, there probably wouldn't be very much more drugs because the drug flow that comes in now is sufficient to satisfy the need or the demand and in every city, town and village in America there is enough drugs to satisfy the demand that probably the only difference would be that it would be somewhat cheaper and maybe therefore the demand would be broader because it would be cheaper because that 10 or 15 percent of the drugs that are picked up as we—as they cross the border and which constitute a cost of doing business and the fact that there is some risk of apprehension, people and equipment raises the cost and the risk of transporting drugs into our country and therefore the price is a little bit higher than it would be if there was no enforcement operators at all, but other than the price going down a bit and perhaps the marketing broadened somewhat, doesn't seem as if there would be any change.

We don't have a system. It is a nonsystem. The fact is any village, town or city can get whatever drugs it wants, and it is poison to our society. As you know, half the violent crime in our country is apparently caused by violent drugs—by narcotic drugs—half the violent crime. I am only going to ask you one more question.

Mr. DION. Could I respond to your statement?

Mr. SCHEUER. Please do.

Mr. DION. I would like to say that the Secretary of State has devoted a great deal of time to this issue. He may not have made public speeches on the repeated occasions that the chairman would like to see, and I admit that his time is taken up with a whole lot of foreign policy issues in addition to this one. But in the case of narcotics, I think he has devoted a great deal of time and action but perhaps it is not as visible as it could be.

For instance, he spoke to our Narcotics Coordinators Conference in May of this year. He delivered a 15-minute speech. He met with them afterward. He had a reception for over 100 of our narcotic officers from all over the world. In June 1987, he was not able to attend personally, but he approved the speech by Mr. Whitehead, the Deputy Secretary who spoke at the international conference in Vienna on drugs.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well apart from some speeches domestically, could you say we have an apparatus in place with Mexico or in any other

country that seems to make a significant contribution to slowing down the transportation of drugs into our country?

Mr. DION. Well, I think the system of consultation that has been established with the government of Mexico between the two Attorneys General and the regular meetings between the Presidents of Mexico and the United States focused a great deal of attention on the issue.

Mr. SCHEUER. Excuse me, the speech you just mentioned, according to staff—just slipped me a note—was a speech by Secretary Shultz to his own staff.

Mr. DION. That is true, but it was also to DEA officers from all over the world.

Mr. SCHEUER. How about Mexican officials?

Mr. DION. It was not a speech to Mexican officials.

Mr. SCHEUER. I say how about busing some chops with Mexican officials to induce them to take this matter seriously, to produce some results.

Mr. DION. I can only say there is no meeting with the governments of major drug producing countries in which narcotics does not figure on the agenda. Mr. Armacost visited Pakistan this week. Narcotics control was one of the main issues on his agenda. There were others, obviously, but it was one of the main issues on the agenda.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, it seems to me that the Golden Triangle of Laos, Burma and China that used to be the source of our narcotics drugs has—has turned into another Golden Triangle from Mexico, Chihuahua and Durango. That seems to be the great source now of narcotic drugs particularly heroin and marijuana, and it is very depressing.

Let me ask you one more question. I have been interested in this matter for over 15 years since the very beginning of this committee, and before, and every year I am told and other members are told that you are catching between 10 and 15 percent, maybe tops 20 percent of the drugs that come over. That means that 85 or 90 percent, at the least 80 percent of the drugs that are shoved into that pipeline at the other end, end up in the cities, villages and towns of America.

Now, in a trip—in trips that we have taken to our Southwest borders, for the first time law enforcement officials, the federal, state and local level are now finally telling us law enforcement can't do it. We can't eradicate enough crops. We can't interdict enough crops to make an appreciable dent.

We have to keep doing what we are doing. The committee agrees with that, but they tell us that the main thrust from here on in has got to be to turn off demand. With that powerful demand surging there with the incredible value that demand places on these hard narcotic drugs, we see little hope in the future that efforts of interdiction—effort of eradication on the fields, efforts of interdiction at the border, even efforts of law enforcement within our county are going to have much avail so long as that powerful demand continues.

And they say we have got to do something about the kids, that we have to rely on massive drug education programs that this ad-

82-045 0 - 88 - 2

ministration has disseminated, and they say that we have to change our behavior.

What is your reaction to whether there is hope over the long pull for our programs of eradication, of interdiction and law enforcement of this country to provide an effective answer to this poisonous problem of drugs ending up in the arms of our children?

Mr. DION. Well, I think you have said it all in your statement, and your previous one, sir. I think there are a whole range of approaches that have to be taken. I think one of the most important is the reduction of the demand by convincing population that drugs are bad for you, and not just young people. I think there are older people and middle-aged people who are also consuming drugs—I think of cocaine in particular, and I think of heroin, and most of them got there by starting off with marijuana.

They have got to be convinced these things are doing terrible damage to them personally, to their children and to their country. But I think meanwhile it behooves us all, and I would have to disagree with you—the law enforcement system——

Mr. SCHEUER. Nobody is suggesting that. Don't put words in my mouth, please.

Mr. DION. But you said what would really happen, would more be coming in——

Mr. SCHEUER. Some more would come in and the price would go down considerably, so from the point of demand curve, it is the enlargement of consumption. But nobody is suggesting that we do any less than we are doing on eradication, any less on interdiction and any less on law enforcement, but the suggestion is, and it is coming from the law enforcement community, it is to us, the main thrust in the future, the main application of new funds ought to be in drug education, to change the behavior of Americans, to get them to stop this irresponsible activity, both as to drugs and as to sex because drugs and AIDS, the utter twin curse of society, are propagated through irresponsible personal behavior to drugs and as to irresponsible sex, and the answer to both of those has to be through a massive education program.

That hasn't happened and isn't happening and that is the shame of this whole situation.

Congressman Traficant?

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say education is certainly going to be the key for our country, but we are not here today dealing with education. We are dealing with international drug trafficking and since the midseventies, brown Mexican heroine has been in this country, and I find, as being a former sheriff, we do not even have an adequate aerial survey program in Mexico.

Anybody in their right mind recognizes Mexico is a lot closer to Nicaragua, and it has a tremendous amount of political turmoil within. People are taking a counterposition to that of the United States and our goals. One of their main exports besides oil to this country is narcotics. And I find it amazing that we have lawyers somewhere in the State Department that are sort of conjuring up ways to advise our operatives in the State Department to in fact maybe reassess the law that Congress passed last year.

Now, I have some rather pointed questions. We have talked about a 15- to 20-percent seizure, and I don't have much time. I

would like to move on to brief questions that anyone can answer. No. one, if we had a 15- to 20-percent seizure, No. one, with approximately 180 tons of cocaine coming into this country, how many tons were seized from Mexico and where were those seizures and do you in fact have that type of data?

Who would answer that for me? That would be—by the way, that would be about 36 tons of seizures.

Mr. CASH. The amount of the cocaine seized in Mexico last year was approximately 5 tons.

Mr. TRAFICANT. With 12 tons of heroin, what was the seizure of that?

Mr. CASH. Well, the eradication figures——

Mr. TRAFICANT. Not asking for that. I am asking for seizure. Do you have those figures?

Mr. CASH. Not with me, but I could provide it.

Mr. TRAFICANT. I would ask unanimous consent that any data that the State Department or any agency they have for that data relative to Mexican narcotics be presented to the committee.

Mr. SCHEUER. Being no objection, so ordered.

[The information appears on p. 106.]

Mr. TRAFICANT. I will thus move off of that. Second of all, we passed legislation that called for a certain amount of economic targets whereby we would put behind the rhetoric and speeches—whether or not the staff or whomever—a program in place that would be reasonably funded that could attack this grave problem.

Now, specifically there were 2,000 positions eliminated from the Customs Service in 1970 and 1988. What is the State Department's position on trying to in fact apprehend contraband such as drugs coming across our borders and the position of reducing by 2,000 units our people working in Customs?

Who would like to answer that?

Mr. DION. Well, you directed it to the State Department, sir, but I don't think I am able to answer. I know that the U.S. Customs Service and the DEA and other law enforcement agencies of the Federal Government have practically tripled the number of agents that they have stationed on the Mexican border, so it may be that the Customs agents that you are talking about are somewhere else.

But I don't know how this determination was reached.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Well, then fine. Then let's talk about the—at about $99 million, the 1988 proposed funding level for the international narcotic control efforts by the State Department, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, was nearly $20 million below the 1987 funding level provided by Congress.

What we are hearing from you and here is a dichotomy that I am saying and hearing, something that upsets me. It is evident that we have not promulgated the type of emergency plan that is necessary for the crisis proportion of drugs coming into this country from Mexico, and it is evident to me that the priorities that Congress has placed have gotten a rather dim view by some in the inner circle of the White House.

We have cut back on our amounts of funds. I do not see the State Department lobbying this body to try and maintain those amounts of money. We have talked about the commission earlier, and we have talked about whether or not in fact we are authorized to go

forward with that, but I do not know if the State Department has ever presented that to any committee in the Congress.

There are questions on whether or not that commission should be aggressively pursued. I guess what I am saying is there is no reason why—no wonder why we have this much drugs in this country. I don't see a program. I think the city of Youngstown Police Department could promulgate a better plan than what I see, and I mean that very sincerely, and what bothers me is that Congress is trying to do something about it.

Now, we don't have the hands-on effort that the operatives do in our respective agency, but I think it is high time—key word, "high," that I think our agency start living up to the intent of that law. So I am going to close out and say I would like to see that data and any other supportive data that you have that will reflect, Number one, on the rhetoric I am hearing about the amount of seizure, the exact amount of seizure, where those seizures were taking place and by whom, and to what effect is the State Department's initiatives through the law that was passed in 1986, what has been your activity and what are your innovative plans, if in fact those plans have not been the priority plans recommended through the legislative remedy that Congress passed last year.

Anyone would like to make a statement, you can have the balance of my time. I will yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. SCHEUER. The gentleman's time has expired. Congressman Coughlin of Pennsylvania.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been sitting here since shortly after 9:30 this morning. I want to sincerely apologize to the panel. I think these hearings, we haven't heard much from you.

I thought we were going to hear from you, and we have certainly had enough of bar-chair speeches, as far as I am concerned.

Let me add, as far as I understand it, our program in Mexico, I think Mr. Taylor said was about a $14.5 million program; is that right?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Is that the largest we have with any country?

Mr. DION. Yes, sir. That is the largest. On occasion our programs have been higher when, for instance, we have provided a large air fleet to a country.

I think in 1981 we provided Colombia with some 20 aircraft, so for that year Colombia's INM program would have been higher than the Mexican program.

But generally speaking, the Mexican program is our biggest and has been since 1973.

Mr. COUGHLIN. And I suspect the number of dollars reflected the importance of the program, to some extent, to the department; am I correct?

Mr. DION. That is correct.

Mr. COUGHLIN. Thank you very much.

I unfortunately have to leave, and I yield my time.

Mr. SCHEUER. Congressman Oxley.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I share the same frustrations my colleague from Pennsylvania does.

I think, Mr. Chairman, if we would stick with the 5-minute rule we would all be a lot better off.

Mr. SCHEUER. When I was designated chairman I brought my egg timer from my office. We are on the 5-minute rule.

Mr. OXLEY. Must be a slow egg timer.

I would like to get back to some questions with regard to Mexico, because I thought that was what the hearing was about today. This is for, Mr. Cash, if you will?

How many narcotics dealers, are viewed as fugitives wanted in the United States, are currently living in Mexico, and has extradition of any of these fugitives been sought?

Mr. CASH. There are roughly 700 such fugitives. The answer to that is, there has never been a time that Mexico has extradited any of its citizens.

The estimate of 921 DEA fugitives living in Mexico has been revised. As of August 1987 there are roughly 700 DEA fugitives who are Mexican Nationals or were born in Mexico. The revised number includes class I, II, III, an IV violators. This number fluctuates as DEA fugitives are arrested, cases dismissed, deaths occur, and new fugitives are added to the system.

Mr. OXLEY. Do we have an extradition treaty with Mexico as we did at least on a couple of occasions with Colombia?

Mr. CASH. No, sir. To my knowledge we don't.

They are working on a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty as we speak, and that has been going on for some time. That would enable an easier exchange of judicial documentation between Mexico and the United States.

There is a program in Mexico that had been used in the past when such exchanges were readily capable of being accomplished, JANUS, or joint prosecution that would take place in Mexico, that would allow the United States to bring the evidence down to Mexico to be used in the Mexican courts.

There had been some difficulties in the exchange of evidentiary items and documents which that Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty hopefully will address and solve.

Mr. OXLEY. Your testimony is we have got roughly 700 fugitives from U.S. justice in Mexico, and roughly 700 have not been extradited and are still in freedom in Mexico; is that right?

Mr. CASH. Yes, sir. Fugitives are a rather large problem for us, Congressman Oxley. As you may know, there are more fugitives for narcotics matters than we have narcotics agents.

Mr. OXLEY. Mr. Dion, did you have a comment on that in regard to our efforts to try to work some kind of extradition treaty with the Mexicans?

Mr. DION. There is no provision for extradition under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty, but there are other provisions that would enable the Mexican Government to prosecute people that we are after, and vice versa.

The draft Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty is currently in the hands of the Mexican authorities and is under study by their Congress.

Mr. OXLEY. Who, if anybody, is looking for those fugitives right now?

Mr. CASH. Well, there are enormous numbers of fugitives out there, Congressman Oxley. We have notified the Mexican Government of who is on the fugitive list.

There have been numerous instances, quite recently, actually, where some major fugitives were located as a result of that exchange. There certainly is an exchange of names, but the Mexican Government, similar to our own, does not develop massive efforts of knocking on doors looking for fugitives.

It is on their lookout. We try to catch them when they come across the border.

It is a posted name, and the Mexican MFJP officers have come up recently with some major fugitives.

Mr. OXLEY. I would like to ask Mr. Ink what he can tell us about the narcotics awareness project in Mexico?

Is that an AID project and if so, how does it work?

Mr. INK. Yes, it is, sir, although it was worked out with the country team and with the Ambassador to Mexico who has given it very strong support.

It is based on the premise that the political price of cooperating in this kind of effort, interdiction and eradication, is extremely high in most Latin American countries as well as others, and that——

Mr. SCHEUER. Would you elaborate on that?

Mr. INK. Yes, sir.

Our experience—we have had quite a bit of experience now over the last several years in Peru, in Bolivia, for example, and there is a problem of serious death threats.

We have seen in Colombia, of course, death threats, many of which have been carried out. In other countries it is also extremely difficult from a political standpoint.

Many of those countries have assumed, unfortunately, that only the industrialized countries, such as the United States, are affected by drug trafficking and the growing of drugs. It is only recently that they are beginning to understand and recognize the impact upon their own communities.

This project that you are referring to is designed to help these countries, in this case Mexico, in their effort to make the communities and the general public aware of the impact of drugs upon their country. So it isn't just a U.S. problem, but it is their problem as well as ours.

I would say, Mr. Chairman, that clearly, awareness programs are not going to eradicate narcotics. They are not going to interdict trafficking but I believe very strongly that concern among the public in these countries about the effect of drugs in their communities is essential if their public officials are going to have enough public support to mount and sustain interdiction and eradication efforts.

Responding to your question more specifically, this project which we have notified the committees of, and which we are beginning to move forward on, involves about $400,000 as a first year effort in Mexico based upon our experience in other Latin American countries.

One element of it is a survey to determine the magnitude of drug use and the habit patterns in the Cuidad Juarez area which is just

across the border from El Paso, as well as the drug use and the abuse patterns in that area by age, sex, occupation, and geographic area.

As has been indicated here this morning we know there are problems. We don't know their extent. Last week I visited the Mexican juvenile detention center in that area just across the border and they were explaining to us that 98 percent of the young people held in that detention center had drug problems.

Recently cocaine is beginning to emerge as a serious problem. As we all know, cocaine is the fastest growing abused drug in the United States and that an increase across the border is a very, very ominous development.

The second part of that project would be to develop communications programs tailored to Mexico, but somewhat similar to what we have been able to do in other countries, particularly Bolivia and Peru. That involves television, radio and other techniques such as coloring books for youngsters. It also would involve posters. I won't have time to show these to you except I would like to mention one.

Mr. SCHEUER. This is in Bolivia and Peru?

Mr. INK. What we are going to do in Mexico is based upon this experience we developed in Bolivia and Peru, and to some extent Belize and several other countries.

Mr. SCHEUER. I hope after that you will explain the benefits of these kinds of education programs to our own administration here in Washington.

Mr. INK. Second, for example a marathon took place in Bolivia, on the 19th of July, just two weeks ago in four major cities in Bolivia. In this particular instance there were, roughly, 5,000 young people, aged 18 to 20, who partook in this marathon in La Paz. They ended up in the main soccer stadium in La Paz, and there, together with their families and other friends, a total of roughly 15,000 people heard talks about drugs and took a mass oath never to use drugs.

Mr. Chairman, I don't know how many of those will live by that oath, but I can tell you that 18 months ago they wouldn't have dared carry out that kind of program.

The Bolivian people tell us they are able to debate narcotic issues now in their Congress they couldn't have debated several years ago. So that is a second example of types of opportunities this project may present in response to your question.

The third element is to design—but not to undertake or fund the design of alternative treatment programs. That involves community referral systems, hot lines and development of crisis prevention centers.

The fourth and last element of this particular project is the design and dissemination of a popular song-based media program using personalities that appeals particularly to young people. As some of you may recall, we had really unprecedented success, much greater than we had anticipated, with the Tatiana and Johnny campaign we financed for reaching teenagers in Mexico and elsewhere with the message concerning sexual responsibility. That was on the hit parade in a number of Latin American countries, and number one for a number of weeks in Mexico.

We are going to the same group that did the song-based media program. We are hoping we might replicate this approach in dealing with drugs. Finally let me say that the organization is FEMAP—Mr. Chairman, and I think you may be familiar with it—Guadelupe de la Vega is Chairman of the Board.

Mr. SCHEUER. Extraordinarily talented person.

Mr. INK. As you know, it is a community based program, which is extremely important. These programs are effective only if you reach the people, only if you reach the families. This is a community based program which involves thousands of volunteers as well as community business leaders and church leaders. They have been able to replicate what has been done in Ciudad Juarez and in 34 other communities throughout Mexico and they have plans for going still further. They have good management. We have put something like $6 million into this program over the last several years—not the drug program but in family planning, and it has been handled extremely well. So there is a business sense as well as a human dimension to this organization. I visited it personally, and I feel very comfortable about moving ahead with this project. Our A.I.D. representative in Mexico, Sam Taylor, is here with us today. If after the hearing, anyone would like to get more information about how we are planning to approach the project, he would be happy to join me in responding.

Mr. OXLEY. How much money was expended for or by A.I.D. in that program in Mexico?

Mr. INK. Well, I have to supply it for the record but I think it is around $6 million. For the recording program, if you are talking about the Latiana and Johnny activity, I believe that was about $300,000. We expect to be able to do this recording cheaper, for about $100,000 because we have already gone through the experience once.

Mr. OXLEY. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. I know that Congressman Traficant has some reservations about getting into this business of community based programs but I am going to ask you just one more question before I yield to him on the subject.

Mr. INK. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. I take it you feel in terms of staunching the flow of narcotics use and narcotics abuse that programs on personal behavior should cover a lot of ground and that responsible sex, as well as only responsible nonuse of drugs are intrinsically intertwined. When you talk to people about not abusing their bodies, that means abstaining from drugs and abstaining from irresponsible sex?

Mr. INK. That is a very strong interrelationship. It doesn't always follow but in many, many cases that is true. In that meeting with young people in Mexico and in the Ciudad Juarez community in particular, we asked that kind of question and their response is very much a long the lines of your question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. It seems to me that what we need in this country are less programs on tobacco abuse, alcohol abuse, sex abuse, drug abuse and more programs on personal behavior and people taking

responsibility for their own lives and that means abstaining from drugs, abstaining from alcohol abuse, abstaining from tobacco, acquiring proper habits on exercise, proper habits on diet and avoiding violent situations. Those are the great life extenders and they are all intrinsically intertwined and related to each other. If we have more pride in ourselves, more concern about the integrity of our lives and our bodies, then improved behavior, it seems, will follow in all of these areas. What we need is less specific patterns against individual patterns of abuse and more programs designed to build self esteem, self esteem in the schools. That is what kids need and if they begin to respect themselves and their prospects and understand the life values of themselves and they have a role in society, they will stop abusing themselves in all of these areas.

Mr. INK. Our experience would certainly bear that out. Now, you cannot reach everyone obviously. You cannot eliminate opposition. With the best programs of this type there would still remain formidable opposition. But the political risk, the political cost to the government officials in Latin American countries is something I believe we underestimate in this country and I think it is important that we help them develop the kind of activity which will provide a better public understanding in those countries of the cost to them, not just the United States.

Mr. SCHEUER. Congressman Traficant?

Mr. TRAFICANT. I commend whatever efforts are being taken to effect the mores of the Mexican community as far as community based programs and efforts are concerned. I comment you on that.

I am wondering if maybe our goal is a little farfetched as far as controlling their illicit sex activities or sexual deviance and/or drug abuse, but here is the comment I want to make.

Mr. INK. We don't plan to control these activities.

Mr. TRAFICANT. I know we don't. I am under the impression the main focus of today's hearing was the massive amount of narcotics that are coming across the border that are poisoning America.

Now what I am hearing is a scenario of many different philosophies and good efforts and programs at the community level back there. Specifically, I think our situation is we need the statistics and facts as to how much our effort is succeeding in stopping their drugs coming into our country.

Their teens are not responsible for this drug smuggling. There are cartels; there are master minds; there are drug barons that are very capable that have effectively learned how to circumvent both the law, our borders and penetrate and sell their drugs here.

So with that in mind, I have looked at some statistics that show me that in 1986, Mexican authorities reported that they had seized throughout Mexico approximately 100 pounds of heroin, 100 pounds.

In 1987, in the first 5 months, they have seized approximately another 100 pounds so I guess there has been an improvement. We might get up to 200 pounds in 1987. This is woefully weak.

This calls for, in my opinion, drastic international intervention at the highest levels.

Now, specifically I just don't know if this is relevant for a part for this record, Mr. Chairman. If it is not, then I preface it.

I would like to know for the record what attorneys in the State Department had authorized the State Department or advised the State Department that they were not authorized to aggressively pursue this commission? I don't know if that is relevant.

Mr. SCHEUER. Of course it is relevant.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Would someone like to answer that?

Who were the attorneys that advised the law that it was passed last year because of the massive drug problem in American some some legislative attempt to being a remedy, who were the attorneys, by name, who advised our State Department to disregard and to study further and or to reconsider the mandate of law that Congress passed?

Mr. DION. I will have to get you an answer on that. I have no idea, sir.

Mr. TRAFICANT. I ask unanimous consent when those names are secured they be presented to the committee.

Mr. SCHEUER. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. TRAFICANT. I have several other questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. Please proceed.

Mr. TRAFICANT. On this matter of fugitives from America running out of our borders and finding exile and comfort in Mexico, and on the answers that I have had so far is that that supposedly Mexico would not or could not because of the tremendous threats in that country, extradite. Is that the testimony of this panel, that Mexico will not extradite or help us find those fugitives which outnumber our DEA agents?

Just a brief answer, if you can.

Mr. CASH. The fugitives that I spoke of, Congressman Traficant, the 700, are only in Mexico. They don't outnumber our DEA agents, but to answer your questions, under the Mexican law they do not extradite their nationals to the United States.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Fine. Let me follow up with this. What bilateral agreements have been attempted or what efforts have been initiated to develop a system of justice where by we would provide the evidence on those fugitives to Mexican authorities and ask their assistance to prosecute those cases or to help us in some way to bring those people to justice in Mexico without extradition?

We are funding a war in Nicaragua because it is close to our border. I am saying this one is a lot closer and if we are going to have people running out of America they are not going to run to Nicaragua where they may be shot.

They are running to Mexico. So what are the programs. What efforts have been made? What movement exists?

What recommendations have you made or suggested and to whom?

Mr. DION. I think, sir, that is part of the draft Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty negotiated with the Mexican Government and which is presently under study by the Mexican Congress.

Mr. TRAFICANT. It is currently under study by the Mexican Congress. So we are saying that we have already the instrument in place.

I don't mean to really sit on it, because I am not blaming you for this, and I am not blaming this President for this, really. I think blame has to go back a long way with a lot of people.

But if we have a possible instrument in place, a vehicle that could lend some support to this area, I want to know why in God's name we haven't actively pursued it.

Mr. DION. Sir, I would like to point out that it is a foreign country and we do have to deal with them as a sovereign state, so we have asked them to study this treaty and they have handed it to their Congress, as our Congress our Senate would study a treaty proposed to us by another government. It is in their hands and we are awaiting a reply.

Mr. TRAFICANT. You have a specific request for the implementation of some program that would in essence at least provide evidence to the Mexican officials, and they would, in fact, then prosecute those fugitives in Mexico for it. Is that what you are saying to this committee?

Mr. DION. I am saying, I don't understand all the provisions of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. The work of the negotiations was done mainly by the Legal Division of the State Department and Department of Justice, but that was the aim of the treaty, to allow this kind of cooperation and prosecution of fugitives.

Mr. TRAFICANT. In line with the serious and grave nature of the matter at hand then, because of the legislative intent which is attached to that particular treaty, I now ask you if you will make available, and I ask unanimous consent that any of materials or directive that you feel relative to addressing this fugitive issue, if you feel it addressed, to make any or all of those copies and or documents pertinent to the treaty available to the committee. Is that reasonable, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SCHEUER. There being no objection, so ordered.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Can you do that?

Mr. DION. I can certainly request it, yes, sir.

Mr. TRAFICANT. What I am trying to say, and perhaps then I will close with this, is it seems that usually when we get into the nitty-gritty of finding out exactly what is transpiring we fall into the nebulous gray areas where we are doing this but it is depending upon that and we do that if this didn't happen.

I guess at some particular point it is time to find out what exact action is taken in the specific by bilateral activities to try and stop this drug traffic. It seems to me it is all too nebulous. That isn't knocking anybody. If DEA needs more agents, let's get them more agents.

If customs needs more agents, let's get them more agents. We need a lot more people on our borders and we know that we are not doing it.

But I think the direction must come from those people who have the hands-on involvement with this problem. I am not so sure we are getting that.

I think Congress is trying to do something and I think maybe, maybe what we are doing has to be tailored a little bit but if it is we have to hear from those people. We need to hear from those DEA agents. We need to hear from these people out there.

If we have fugitives running across the border, they have been running across the border for a long time and we know that and we want them back. Now, one last question. What in essence is our involvement with Canada as far as this same fugitive situation?

Are there any differences in our activities and our engagement with Canada versus that of Mexico?

Mr. DION. Sir, I don't have any responsibility for Canadian-American relations so we will have to look into that. But it may well be we have an extradition treaty with Canada. With most countries we do.

Mr. TRAFICANT. That is what we would want to know, not necessarily if you have any involvement with them but what differences are there between the two.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Mr. SCHEUER. Thank you.

Our staff director, Ed Jurith.

Mr. JURITH. One follow up about extradition. Notwithstanding the present negotiations over the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty there are provisions in the Single Convention in 1961 allowing for the exchange of evidence between the signatory to that treaty to develop cases in countries against fugitives and narcotics violators.

Have we attempted to use, and maybe Mr. Cash can answer this question, if you can't, have we attempted to use the provisions of the Single Convention, the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty aside, have we attempted to use the provisions of the Single Convention to prosecute fugitives that we have evidence on in Mexico, sharing that evidence with the Office of the Mexican Attorney General?

Mr. DION. I am not able to answer that. I am sorry.

Mr. CASH. To the best of my knowledge we have not pursued that. That is something that is decided by the Justice Department and State Department as to what tools we should correctly use under whatever diplomatic rules of the game but I am not aware of us using the Single Convention.

Mr. JURITH. Thank you.

Mr. SCHEUER. Would our colleague in the American Embassy in Mexico like to address himself to that question?

Mr. SAMUEL TAYLOR. Not really.

Mr. SCHEUER. OK.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, just a brief comment.

I think it makes a lot of people wonder, and at this particular point it makes me wonder, just how serious we are because with all of the laws this country has, and all the agreements and treaties we have, it would seem to be that there would be some statute, some law, some aspect of a law which would give us much more teeth with dealing with these problems. And I am just not so sure that maybe it is not going to take new laws, maybe going to take an aggressive search within the laws we have to come up with one of those areas like we have done with the RICO Act in dealing with crime in this country, why in fact we haven't accomplished that in this drug business.

So with that, I more or less pose the question perhaps even for the committee and maybe ask that the committee might review that at some particular point whether areas of law that exist might give us more teeth in this area.

Mr. SCHEUER. Well, we have come to the end of the line this morning. Let me say that you have heard an incredible amount of frustration vented up here in anger, not at you gentlemen who are working under Herculean odds with the most extraordinarily diffi-

cult combination of circumstances against you, not the least being sentences of execution that are made and carried out against our law enforcement officials abroad and law enforcement officials in the countries with which we are dealing, so nobody is saying that this is a simple effort with simplistic answers out there for those of us who have been working over the years, the decades, know how complicated it has been and how completely unavailing our efforts have been in any significant sense under a Democratic and Republican Administration.

This is not a political question. The problem is deep-seeded and long-lasing and it has expanded administrations and we have been just as critical of prior dimensions as we are of this one. Nothing that we try in the field of eradication and interdiction, eradication in the poppy fields of Mexico or Turkey or Laos, Burma, Thailand seems real to have any significant and lasting effect.

Our interdiction efforts are pitiful. The organized gangs that are sending this stuff into this country seem to outman us, out-gun us, out-spend us and they have virtually free access to this country with maybe 10 or 15 percent attrition rate of the stuff they shove into the pipeline.

Does anybody here think that those figures over the next few years could be reversed? Are we going to be able to pick up 80 percent of the stuff that crosses our border rather than pick up 20 percent? Anybody of any real hope for a significant improvement in the volume of drugs that we pick up, that we eradicate and pick up so that there is a marked diminution of drugs coming into our country?

Mr. DION. Sir, I think in the case of cocaine that the American public is becoming aware that this is in fact a dangerous drug that is killing people and destroying people's lives, and meanwhile I think there are greater efforts underway abroad and with our support to get rid of the cocaine crops in the main producing countries.

Mr. SCHEUER. How about heroin?

Mr. DION. Heroin is a very, very difficult problem and a different issue, as you know, sir. The production of heroin in Turkey was eliminated in the early 1970's.

Mr. SCHEUER. That is one of our few little victories along the way, but heroin—but Turkey has been affirmatively—has been affirmatively substituted for, have they not, by countries up and down Latin America and Mexico as a result.

Mr. DION. Pakistan has now brought down its production dramatically, to something like one-eighth what it was in 1979.

Mr. SCHEUER. Has there been any reduction of heroin coming over our borders and into the arms of our kids?

Mr. DION. I have to defer to Mr. Cash on that.

Mr. SCHEUER. What about the heroin coming across our borders?

Mr. CASH. My best estimate—as you know, the answer to that question is, no, but by the same token, we are regrettably not able to say how much is coming in. So with difficulties——

Mr. SCHEUER. Enough is coming in to satisfy the demand. Is that a statement we can all agree on?

Mr. CASH. That is true, sir, and I think, Mr. Dion, you may have inadvertently hit upon what may be the final solution when you

said that the American public is becoming conscious of the fact that cocaine is a deadly drug and that may cause the demand for cocaine to diminish. There is no evidence that the supply of cocaine, heroin or marijuana over the border is diminishing. In my opinion the ultimate answer is that we have to reduce the demand.

We have to change the behavior of the American public. We have to enhance their feeling of responsibility for their own health. They have to understand that irresponsible sex, as well as irresponsible drug use spells a sentence of death for them. It destroys lives, destroys families. It destroys careers, and it is a killer and until the American public really absorbs that message on a vast scale and until the administration, any administration, be it Democrat or Republican, acts with the kind of foresight that Mr. Ink outlined, that we are showing in Mexico and Peru, in those countries with significant education programs aimed at their youth, I don't see any chance for real progress being made here.

I wish we were as thoughtful and compassionate on the home front, Mr. Ink, as we apparently seem to be in devising significant education programs for the youth of Mexico and Peru. I hope that they will come very soon.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Mr. Chairman, I, too, didn't want to seem to be sitting on everybody here. I know the people on this panel have worked hard. With the constraints they have, it is truly tough. But if DEA had the resources, I think they would be the best drug enforcement agency anywhere. But in closing out, just a brief question.

There are some legislative initiatives that call for possible capital punishment for large drug smugglers or any smuggler who took any action that ultimately ended up taking the life of a policeman involved with it. How would you feel about that type of legislation, Mr. Cash.

Mr. CASH. Well, sir, we are always in favor of anything that we would believe would be a determent to the assault that continues on drug law enforcement, as well as regular law enforcement agents throughout the United States, so in that regard I would not see it opposed.

Mr. TRAFICANT. Some legislative initiatives calls for either the life sentence or the death penalty, leaving it in the hands of a judge depending on if it is more than 10 kilograms of cocaine or heroin and/or the killing of a law enforcement officer during the transaction of a drug offense. And you would support that?

Mr. CASH. I would think we would, sir.

Mr. SCHEUER. How about the State Department?

Mr. DION. I can't speak for the Department of State, but I personally would be all in favor. I don't know that the Department of State would be called upon to take a stand on a domestic issue like capital punishment.

Mr. TRAFICANT. I want to also echo the statements of the chairman here. Mr. Ink, I think what is going on is very good. Our effort today was on smuggling and I hope, though, that we can reduce the demand like our chairman has mentioned. I think that is the key all over.

Mr. INK. Mr. Chairman, I think, following your two statements, that this is an international problem, and therefore it is essential

that the people, not only in the United States, but in the other countries, people in all the countries involved, develop an increasing awareness of the casualties that narcotics inflict upon their communities, upon their families, and upon individuals. This is something we can join across international lines in combatting.

It is not Republican; it is not Democrat. It is not nationalistic. This is an area in which families can reach across borders in a common cause.

Mr. SCHEUER. That is true, Mr. Ink. But it is perfectly obvious that there seems to be little hope and none of you have expressed any hope of the production of joint action across national lines. We wish it would be effective. We hope that it will be more effective. We will do everything reasonable that we can to make it effective, but I have to quote a little Shakespeare to you. "The fault, Dear Brutus, lies not in the stars, but in ourselves."

As far as America is concerned, until we change our behavior, until we teach our kids responsible personal behavior, until we teach them that drugs are a no-no, that drugs threaten, lives, careers and families, I fear it will be academic to rely on joint international action.

I want to thank the GAO for responding to Congressman Rangel's request. I want to thank all of you for your candid, thoughtful testimony. With that, the hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the chair.]

PREPARED STATEMENTS

STATEMENT OF THE

HONORABLE CHARLES B. RANGEL

CHAIRMAN

SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL

HEARING ON NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORTS IN MEXICO

B352 RAYBURN HOB

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1987

9:30 A.M.

Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

Today the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control will conduct a hearing on narcotics control efforts in Mexico and U.S. Government assistance for these efforts. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of experts to testify before the committee.

Mexico is one of the most crucial nations in our efforts to control the illicit traffic and abuse of narcotic substances. It is the single largest supplier of both heroin and marijuana to the United States. Additionally, over one-third of the cocaine smuggled into the United States transits Mexico and crosses our common border.

These statistics are all the more disheartening when compared with narcotics control efforts in Mexico a mere five years ago. In the late 70's and early 80's, Mexico was touted as being a shining example of a narcotics source country with an effective and successful narcotics control program. The Mexican people and government were rightfully proud of their accomplishments in this area.

Yet, something has gone seriously awry. Recently, Mr. Gilman and I had the privilege of participating as official delegates to the Mexican-U.S. Interparliamentary Conference. Our main goal was to discuss this crucial problem facing both our nations.

I am convinced that the Mexican leadership is seriously committed to fighting drug trafficking. Many fine and dedicated Mexican drug enforcement officers have lost their lives in this battle. I understand that Mexican authorities seized five times more heroin in 1986 than in 1985, and double the amount of cocaine. In that same period of time, eradication of opium poppy rose by 3.7 percent and the eradication of marijuana increased by 71 percent.

These are impressive figures, yet the bottom line is that drug traffickers have continued to rapidly outpace drug control efforts by dramatically increasing cultivation acreage. Obviously, while the traffickers have gotten wise to the control efforts and developed new ways to get around these efforts, the narcotics control strategy did not keep pace with new cultivation techniques or the increased volume.

Today, the Committee wants to find out what plan, if any, the United States has developed in concert with Mexico to respond jointly and effectively to the escalating drug

production and traffic in Mexico. We also want to take a good, hard look at how to resolve some of the technical problems that have plagued our control efforts. For example, with the recent trend toward cultivating smaller plots of opium poppy on rough, mountainous terrain, can our current aircraft detect these plots? Can the current aircraft maneuver sufficiently to eradicate these areas?

The drug control issue has unfortunately caused some friction in our relationship with our neighbor. But effective narcotics control efforts require the full cooperation and commitment of both governments. The success of these efforts is vital to both countries. Our discussions with Mexican legislators over the past several years have demonstrated an awareness of this fact on both sides of the border.

In the spirit of cooperation on this vital issue, the 1986 Mexico-U.S. Interparliamentary Conference passed a resolution to establish a Mexico-U.S. Intergovernmental Commission on Narcotic and Psychotropic Drug Abuse and Control. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 directed the Administration to enter negotiations with the Government of Mexico to establish this Commission and appoint Members. Our 1987 Interparliamentary session reaffirmed the commitment on both sides of the border to get this Commission in operation. We want to learn the status of these negotiations.

In addition I am interested in the status of the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty which was negotiated in 1986. The treaty contains many provisions which will greatly enhance narcotics control cooperation, such as sharing evidence, witnesses and forfeited assets in narcotics cases which cross our border.

In addition to the narcotics enforcement issues, I am looking forward to hearing about the A.I.D. proposal for a narcotics awareness pilot program in Ciudad Juarez. I know that A.I.D. has developed drug awareness programs in Peru and Bolivia, and certainly Mexico stands to benefit from such preventive efforts.

I look forward to the testimony this morning. I hope it will shed some light on situation in Mexico, and perhaps help us resolve some of the problems we currently face in this critical area of narcotics control.

Congressman Solomon P. Ortiz

Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control

August 5, 1987

OPENING STATEMENT

MR. CHAIRMAN: I WANT TO COMMEND YOUR LEADERSHIP BY CALLING THIS IMPORTANT HEARING TODAY. AS A MEMBER OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BORDER CAUCUS, I REALIZE THE SIGNIFICANCE AND NECESSITY OF BROADENING CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE OF OUR MEXICAN NEIGHBORS.

THROUGHOUT THE YEAR, THE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS ANALYZED AND ENCOURAGED THE EFFORTS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS TO ERADICATE DRUG PRODUCTION IN THEIR RESPECTIVE NATIONS. IN ADDITION, CONTROLLING THE MOVEMENT OF ILLICIT SUBSTANCES AROUND THE WORLD HAS BEEN A CONCERN. BOTH ISSUES ARE PREVALENT IN THIS HEARING ON MEXICO.

---1---

THERE ARE MANY REASONS WHY COOPERATION WITH MEXICAN AUTHORITIES IS CRITICAL TO DRUG CONTROL HERE IN THE U. S. THE MOST OBVIOUS IS THE EXPANSIVE, TWISTING, 2,000 MILE LONG BORDER THAT WE SHARE WITH MEXICO. AS WE ARE AWARE, CONTROLLING THE FLOW OF DRUGS ALONG THIS BORDER HAS BEEN LESS THAN SUCCESSFUL. DESPITE THE BRAVE WORK OF MANY FEDERAL AGENTS STATIONED AT THE BORDER, THE GEOGRAPHIC COMPLEXITY OF THE REGION HAS MADE ATTEMPTS AT DRUG ENFORCEMENT INCREDIBLY DIFFICULT. THE CONGRESS HAS APPROPRIATED MONEY FOR MORE OFFICERS ALONG THE BORDER. WE HAVE ALSO PROVIDED EQUIPMENT, TRAINING AND SOME PERSONNEL, FOR ERADICATION RAIDS IN RURAL AREAS OF MEXICO.

---3---

AT THIS TIME, HOWEVER, IT IS ESTIMATED THAT MEXICO SUPPLIES A LARGE PORTION OF HEROIN AND MARIJUANA TO THE U.S. MARKET. CLEARLY, STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE CONTINUED PRODUCTION OF THESE LIFE-DRAINING DRUGS. I KNOW THAT LAW ENFORCEMENT AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN MEXICO HAVE TAKEN GREAT STRIDES TOWARD FIGHTING DRUG GROWERS AND MERCHANT OPERATING IN MEXICO. I WOULD LIKE TO PROMISE MEXICAN AUTHORITIES THAT WE WOULD DRY UP OUR MARKET BY REDUCING DEMAND. THIS IS A SITUATION THAT HAS SHOWN ONLY MARGINAL IMPROVEMENT IN RECENT YEARS.

BY COMBINING OUR RESOURCES AND WORKING WITH THOSE MEXICAN AUTHORITIES BATTLING CITIZENS WITHIN THEIR OWN NATION, WE CAN HAVE A POSITIVE INFLUENCE AND REDUCE THE FLOW OF DRUGS FROM MEXICO TO AMERICA.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING THE TESTIMONY OF OUR DISTINGUISHED WITNESSES TODAY. I REALIZE THIS PROBLEM MAY ONLY BE SOLVED WITH OUR NATIONS WORKING TOGETHER. LET US EXPLORE EFFECTIVE METHODS FOR ACCOMPLISHING OUR MUTUAL GOAL OF DECREASED DRUG USAGE AND TRAFFICKING.

United States General Accounting Office

GAO Testimony

For Release
on Delivery
9:30 a.m. EST
Wednesday
August 5, 1987

# U.S. - MEXICO OPIUM POPPY AND MARIJUANA AERIAL ERADICATION PROGRAM

Statement of
Joseph E. Kelley, Associate Director,
National Security and International Affairs
Division
U.S. General Accounting Office

Before the
Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and
Control
House of Representatives

GAO/T-NSIAD-87-42

Mr. Chairman,

We appreciate this opportunity to discuss our views on the U.S.-Mexico aerial opium poppy and marijuana crop eradication program. We reviewed the aerial eradication program in accordance with Section 2007 of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, which required GAO to evaluate the effectiveness of U.S. international narcotics control assistance provided pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. We expect to issue a report on our review in the near future.

The U.S. Department of State and the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico have been long-term partners in a program to destroy opium poppy and marijuana fields in Mexico with herbicides sprayed from aircraft. U.S appropriations for this program since 1977 exceed $150 million. The United States allocated $15.5 million for fiscal year 1987, $10.55 million of which will cover the cost of aircraft spare parts and maintenance services under a contract between the Attorney General's Office and a U.S. firm. U.S. officials in Mexico reported that Mexico's 1987 appropriation will exceed $18 million.

We reviewed the joint aerial eradication program to determine

1. the extent to which the program has over time reduced the amount of heroin and marijuana which is produced in Mexico and smuggled into the United States;

2. whether the Office of the Attorney General of Mexico is using U.S.-purchased and maintained aircraft in a manner which maximizes aerial spraying of opium poppy and marijuana fields; and

3. whether the program's formal bilateral agreements provide an adequate basis for the ongoing cooperation needed to eliminate, as quickly and efficiently as possible, opium poppy and marijuana cultivation in Mexico.

Our review did not cover other bilateral narcotics control activities such as investigations or interdiction, nor did we review other Mexico efforts to limit production and trafficking of dangerous drugs or conversion and transiting of cocaine.

Program statistics show that between 1977 and 1980, the eradication program, benefitted by poor weather, caused significant decreases in the U.S. availability of heroin and marijuana from Mexico. To illustrate--in 1975, 5.2 metric tons of heroin available in the United States originated in Mexico; however, by 1980 the U.S. supply of Mexican heroin had dropped to less than 1.4 metric tons. Although statistics from the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of State and the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee differ, they agree that, while the supply of heroin from Mexico is significantly less than during the peak

years, it has increased in recent years and now represents about 40 percent of the United States supply. In 1986, according to the Department of State, between 2 and 4 metric tons of heroin reaching the United States originated in Mexico. As a result of the earlier aerial eradication program, the supply of Mexican marijuana in the U.S. market was only 6 percent, or about 750 metric tons, by 1982. However, by 1986, 37 percent of all imported marijuana available in the United States, or more than 3,000 metric tons, originated in Mexico.

Annual cultivation and eradication statistics are equally inexact; however, they do show that less than 40 percent of the total estimated cultivation of opium poppy and marijuana has been eradicated by the bilateral program.

We found several problems with the management of the program, which, if addressed, could result in improved program performance. For example, there is a need to improve the information base for planning purposes, increase the efficiency of personnnel and resource management, and improve the administration of the aviation operations administered by the Deputy Attorney General. In regard to the latter we identified areas where improvements in aviation management and maintenance could improve aircraft availability and utilization rates and thereby increase the number of flight hours devoted to spraying.

Also, reported corruption has had an undeterminable but deterimental, effect on the program.

At the time of our fieldwork, the Attorney General's airfleet consisted of about 30 airplanes and 55 helicopters. In addition to this airfleet, the Department of State had assigned a varying number of fixed-wing agricultural spray planes to the Mexican program on a trial basis.

Department of State personnel in Mexico had developed aviation performance expectations for the eradication program. For example, they believed it was reasonable for each aircraft to be flown an average of 80 hours per month. They also believed it was reasonable to expect that, on the average, 80 percent of the airfleet would be in operating condition and 20 percent in maintenance. However, they had not developed a standard or expectation regarding the percentage of flight time which should be devoted to aerial spraying as opposed to other aviation tasks such as reconnaissance, verification or transporting personnel and supplies.

We found that program aircraft were flown an average of 48 hours per month; substantially fewer than the 80 hours per month average considered reasonable by Department of State officials. We did not independently determine the extent to which maintenance delays reduced aircraft availability; however, various reports suggest

that at times as little as 40 percent of the airfleet was in running order and available for program purposes. This compares poorly to the U.S. suggestion that 80 percent availability was reasonable and even less favorably to the 90 percent availability rate called for in the maintenance services contract between the Attorney General's Office and the U.S. contractor.

There were numerous problems in the aviation operation which could account for the program's relatively weak performance. For example, poor maintenance scheduling caused overloaded repair facilities, and inadequate inventory controls resulted in excess supplies of some parts, and insufficient supplies of others. Overloaded facilities and poor parts management lengthened the time aircraft were on the ground for inspection and repair thereby decreasing available flight time.

Another problem concerned eradication personnel. We were told that because their salaries were substantially less than those paid in the private sector, there was high turnover among program pilots and mechanics. In April the program had 113 pilots and needed at least 24 additional pilots to maintain a full-time program. There was a comparable shortage of trained mechanics. Various reports stated that mechanics have engaged in a work slow down for several months to protest their low wages. The shortage and turnover of pilots and mechanics not only had an adverse effect on aircraft utilization and availability rates but could increase accident

repair and training costs which the United States has historically paid as part of its contribution to aviation maintenance and management operations.

Statistics showed that helicopters were used less often for spraying than for other program tasks such as reconnaissance or transport. The Deputy Attorney General told us the extensive use of helicopters for non-spraying purposes reflected the program's need for additional aircraft. It appears that Department of State and Mexican officials are in agreement on the need for additional aircraft to increase the airfleet's eradication capability. In late 1983, the United States provided the first of several fixed-wing agricultural spray planes for the Mexico program. The planes were added to the eradication program on a trial basis dependent on favorable evaluations by both the United States and Mexico of its utility in Mexico. However, Mexican officials were never convinced that the aircraft was suitable for spraying operations in mountainous terrain and as of April the planes were reassigned. We have been advised that the Attorney General's office has decided to purchase 14 additional helicopters for the program. However, U.S. officials believe that Mexico is purchasing a relatively inefficient model because they are limited to use at lower altitudes and have limited fuel and herbicide spraying capabilities. It is unfortunate that neither purchase was based on bilateral analysis of the airfleet and agreement as to need for any changes or additions. Lack of bilateral acceptance of the U.S.

spray airplanes ultimately resulted in their removal from Mexico, and it remains to be seen whether Mexico's most recent choice of helicopters was the optimal one for the program.

In addition to operational problems which reduce the effectiveness of the current airfleet, there were broader issues requiring bilateral attention. For example, after more than a decade of activity, program managers still lack a complete picture of the extent and location of opium poppy and marijuana cultivation throughout Mexico. In addition, the United States and Mexico have not been able to agree upon a methodology to develop annual eradication goals based upon mutually acceptable aviation performance standards.

We also noted that the bilateral verification project, implemented by DEA and the Attorney General's office in fiscal year 1984, and designed to provide more credibilty to eradication claims and information on the effectiveness of equipment, herbicides and spray techniques, could be improved by adding a ground verification component. The project has primarily been limited to aerial verification because it lacks a helicopter needed to obtain on-ground intelligence. Although DEA was promised a helicopter, one had not been provided by the time of our field work. Various U.S. observers have also suggested that verification may be less accurate than claimed because of the difficulty of verifying small fields from high- and fast-flying fixed-wing aircraft, which may be



82-045 O - 88 - 3

more useful for general reconnaissance than for more precise verification.

We found that the formal agreements between the United States and Mexico, which should document mutual understandings and expectations, do not address important program elements. Specifically, recent agreements do not

-- address the methodology for comprehensive surveys of the Mexican cultivation base,

-- include mutually acceptable annual eradication targets developed in accordance with pre-agreed standards for aircraft utilization and availability,

-- provide for a mutually acceptable and fully equipped program to measure and verify eradication accomplishments, and

-- provide for a mutually acceptable program of periodic evaluation and audit.

Many of these problems are not new. In 1977 we also found unreliable information on the extent of opium poppy cultivation and problems in progam management such as insufficient spare parts, low salaries, and inadequate program monitoring. After 10 years, U.S. and Mexican program managers have not solved these problems nor

agreed on annual goals and standards for aviation management and evaluation even on an informal basis. Since we believe resolution of these issues is important to program success, we believe that they should now be made part of the program's formal agreement process.

We understand that since the completion of our fieldwork the Embassy in Mexico has developed an operational plan which, if effectively implemented, could help resolve many of the issues noted in our review.

- - - -

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement, we will be happy to respond to any questions you or the committee members may have.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. GILMAN

AT THE

NARCOTICS SELECT COMMITTEE'S HEARING

ON

MEXICO - UNITED STATES NARCOTICS

CONTROL EFFORTS (AUGUST 5, 1987)

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to welcome our distinguished panelists at today's hearing and hope that they will be able to inform us on how we can improve upon United States-Mexico efforts to combat the illicit production, trafficking and consumption of drugs which are jeopardizing the health of citizens in both nations and undermining our societal institutions.

During the late 1970's and early 1980's, Mexico had developed one of the most effective narcotics control programs in the world -- a program that we urged other drug producing nations to emulate. However, during the past few years, efforts to combat the illicit production and trafficking of drugs in Mexico have deteriorated, partly due to the increased effectiveness of the drug growers and traffickers, partly due to corruption that exists on both sides of the border, and partly due to the laxness on our part.

This hearing is not intended to bash the Government of Mexico, or to unilaterally find fault with their programs. Rather, it is intended to get our narcotics control programs back on track -- to improve upon our efforts to jointly combat drug trafficking and drug abuse.

It serves no useful purpose for either Mexico or the United States to find fault with one another. Waging war against the drug traffickers -- international criminal syndicates -- who have the most sophisticated equipment, who are well-financed and who are well organized -- goes beyond the capabilities of any single nation. Furthermore, we in the United States need to put our own house in order before we accuse another nation of failing to do its part in this war.

That is why we are here today -- to find out how we can improve upon our narcotics control programs. Combatting drug trafficking and drug abuse is a constant battle, and in that regard we need Mexico's assistance. It is in their interest and our interest for both nations to work together to jointly construct effective drug prevention and control programs.

I would hope that our distinguished witnesses from the General Accounting Office, the State Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Agency for International Development will assist us in developing policies and programs that will lead to greater cooperative efforts between our two nations to stem the ever increasing flood of drugs across our joint Southwest border -- a tidal wave that is undermining the political, economic and social institutions of both nations.

As a delegate to the recently completed 27th Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference, along with our distinguished Chairman, Mr. Rangel, the delegations from both nations were able to agree on a number of important recommendations at the conclusion of the conference. Among them were: (1) agreement to work to adjust and update legislation to prevent and penalize illegal drug acts, and to exchange all relevant documents on legislative initiatives; (2) agreement to seek educational measures to reduce the consumption of drugs; (3) efforts to develop a cooperative, constructive, regional approach to our drug problems; (4) efforts to speed the final ratification of the pending Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty; and (5) reaffirm the need for an intergovernmental commission to seek solutions to our narcotic problems.

We must, however, ensure that these good intentions are acted upon. I welcome our panelists comments and suggestions on how we can make these good intentions a reality.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY JERROLD MARK DION
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
to
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
August 5, 1987

MR. CHAIRMAN:

The Committee has called this hearing to pursue concerns about the Mexican narcotics control program. Our testimony today is directed to issues raised in your letter and is intended to provide you with a status report on all key program areas.

We share your concerns about the viability of the program as a whole. We also see a number of areas of mutual endeavor between the U.S. and Mexico in narcotics control, some progressing satisfactorily, others needing improvement. We will identify advances we believe have been made but also point out what we see as critical problems.

Our aim is for the Committee to understand that both the U.S. authorities and the Government of Mexico are aware of the problems in the program, and have been for two years, and have worked together to take corrective actions.

SUMMARY ASSESSMENT

The focal point of the narcotics control effort in Mexico is the crop eradication program. The results of the 1986 fall campaign were not as impressive as we had hoped. As INM reported last March in our International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, inefficiencies in the aerial eradication effort remain. Over the last six months, INM has sponsored a series of evaluations of the aerial spray program and of aviation maintenance requirements. The Embassy in Mexico City has drawn up a revised strategy for narcotics control during the same time frame. Our evaluations are approaching conclusion, and the Embassy strategy is currently under review in Mexico City and Washington. Since the inception of narcotics control programs in the early 1970s, the Government of Mexico has been reluctant to draw up a joint plan with specified objectives. Their stated concern was that such a plan might be viewed as a derogation of Mexican sovereignty and could contain goals that might prove unattainable for reasons beyond GOM control. The Mexican authorities are actively discussing amended strategies with us right now, however, and

the various evaluation documents will be used to make recommendations for improvements in the eradication program.

Advances

The following advances have been made in the Mexican program during the last year.

The mutual commitment to narcotics control was reemphasized in a series of high level meetings, especially those between the attorneys general and the two Presidents. Marijuana and opium poppy eradication totals increased in 1986, above 1985 levels, and an improved spray strategy has been adopted for 1986 and future years. Mexico increased its financial commitment to the program, a difficult decision given the state of its economy. We have established a joint training center with regularly scheduled refresher courses for PGR pilots. We instituted a comprehensive reporting system on eradication data and aircraft ulitization, along with computerized tracking of spare parts procurement.

Aerial surveys are being conducted of opium poppy and marijuana cultivations, including surveys to determine new production zones. We are now engaging in joint evaluations of our various combined efforts. DEA, with INM funding, is providing training courses for Mexican Federal Judicial Police.

We have again achieved full staffing of the Narcotics Assistance Unit. The Director and Deputy Director positions are filled by highly qualified Foreign Service officers, and we have added one aviation and one maintenance advisor, giving a total (including 2 secretaries) of seven U.S. direct hire or contract personnel working for the NAU in Mexico.

Key Problems

The gains in eradication are real, but production of these drug crops remains too high, and the increases in eradication are at best only partial successes. The fundamental problem is that too many Mexican officials still regard the Mexican narcotics control effort as a program which benefits only the United States. This feeling is intertwined with the sovereignty issue. We must remember that the narcotics control program in Mexico is a Mexican program and the United States plays a strong but supportive role.

Accountability and management are key problems in the maintenance contract. The program has been hindered by poor morale among pilots, mechanics and navigators as a result of low salaries, leading to serious loss of trained pilots. The GOM has taken steps to increase salaries, however, and we are jointly sponsoring training new pilots. We are also taking

steps to correct underutilization and lack of availablity of aircraft. U.S. and Mexican officials meet at least weekly to resolve these problems; evaluations of the program over the last six months are designed to find solutions.

As in many other narcotics producing/trafficking countries, corruption remains a serious concern that will not abate easily, given the severity of the Mexico's economic crisis.

Other concerns include the lack of a comprehensive joint plan, a concern voiced by the Committee, and the lack of a complete data base for cultivation statistics.

CURRENT NARCOTICS SITUATION

DEA signature analysis indicates that 39% of the heroin available in the U.S. in 1985 originated in Mexico. This reverses an eight-year trend of decreasing Mexican heroin availability in the United States. Approximately 30% of the marijuana available in the U.S. is produced in Mexico. There is also evidence that Colombian marijuana is now transiting Mexico, responding to a shortage in marijuana availability in the U.S. An estimated one-third of the cocaine consumed in the U.S. transits Mexico from production and refining locations in South America.

The plans to expand aerial surveys are based in part on reports that opium poppy is now being grown outside the traditional Mexican growing areas and may be cultivated year round. Marijuana cultivation takes place in virtually every state in Mexico, although the areas of primary cannabis cultivation are in the northern states of Sonora, Sinaloa and Chihuahua.

ERADICATION

Thus far in 1987, eradication efforts have concentrated on the spraying of marijuana, as opposed to opium poppy. Compared to the first six months of 1986, the PGR has eradicated 32% fewer hectares of opium poppy (total 872 hectares) and 45% more hectares of marijauna (total 822 hectares) so far in 1987. The Vanguard Program, a joint U.S./Mexican effort to verify the PGR's efforts independently, confirmed that 3,844 of 3,863 fields sprayed in the first quarter of 1987 were actually destroyed. The PGR reported that it destroyed 105 hectares of marijuana manually as well as 13 hectares of opium.

It is not possible to extrapolate complete data for 1987 from the above figures because the most extensive narcotics crop eradication will be accomplished during the fall Pacifico campaign.

THE VANGUARD PROGRAM

The Mexican eradication statistics we use in the INCSR and elsewhere are furnished by the Mexican Attorney General's Office (PGR). Their aerial eradication statistics are verified through Operation Vanguard's verification program, conducted by DEA and the PGR. While this program is based on a sample of the total number of fields eradicated, DEA reports that it selects the fields to be checked and that, of those checked, over 90% have been destroyed. Given time restraints and currently available technology, it is not possible to check all eradication statistics.

FALL ERADICATION CAMPAIGN -- PACIFICO VIII

The PGR has scheduled the special fall eradication campaign, Pacifico VIII, to run from late summer until next February or March. Approximately fifteen pairs of spray/cover helicopters are to be commited to the campaign. Seven more teams will be added once all 14 new Bell 206B helicopters being purchased by the Mexican Government become available. The new aircraft will operate as a mobile eradication strike force. To coordinate the eradication zones with the zone pattern used for other activities, the PGR has increased the number of zones from 13 to 18. The major focus of the campaign will be the traditional growing states of Sinaloa, Chihuahua, Durango, Nayarit and Guerrero. However, the PGR has expanded the territory covered under Pacifico VIII to newer growing areas in Michoacan, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Veracruz and Sonora. The NAU is assisting the campaign by providing support equipment, procuring herbicides, and funding physical improvements to the main Culican base and to 12 to 14 forward helicopter bases.

ENFORCEMENT

Both marijuana and cocaine seizures are up thus far this year. In 1986 100 MT tons of marijuana were seized, compared to 250 MT during the first five months of this year. Compared to 5 MT of cocaine seized by the Mexicans in 1986, the Mexicans seized 3.2 metric ton of cocaine in transit to the U.S between January and May of this year. Of this amount, the Army reportedly seized 1.4 metric ton of cocaine. On June 10, the Mexican Army reported the largest bust in Mexican history -- one metric ton of cocaine in Sinaloa. Mexican authorities have also also confiscated a sizeable amount of property used by drug traffickers this year. This inventory includes 892 weapons, 683 land vehicles, 15 aircraft, and seven maritime vessels.

CULTIVATION STATISTICS AND THE AERIAL SURVEY PROGRAM

There is still no complete data base for narcotics production in Mexico. The statistics on cultivation and

production presented in the 1987 INCSR represent the best estimate at this time. In early 1986, the U.S. funded an aerial survey of narcotic crop cultivation in the critical tri-state growing area of Sinaloa, Chihuahau and Durango to help provide a better estimate of total illicit hectarage. We are working with the Mexicans now to accomplish an aerial survey of Guerrero and a visual ground survey of Vera Cruz in the fall. In order to provide the Government of Mexico with its own aerial survey capability, INM is having a PGR King Air retrofitted for aerial survey work, purchasing a camera, and providing necessary pilot, camera operator and flight planning training for this mission. It probably will not be ready before February; INM will contract for the fall survey as we did last year. Also in the fall, PGR navigators will be trained in photo interpretation; we will also conduct field demonstrations of the Biovision and Pathlink systems. With the results of these surveys, we will be in a better position to provide a more reliable estimate of increases or decreases in opium cultivation. We hope to begin surveys to measure marijuana cultivation in the near future.

THE MLAT

In September 1986, the United States negotiated ad referendum a draft Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) which is currently under review by both governments. The draft treaty, which provides for mutual legal assistance concerning the suppression, investigation and prosecution of crimes, is designed to promote closer bilateral cooperation on criminal matters, including narcotics. We continue to pursue the satisfactory conclusion of the Treaty at the highest levels of the Mexican Government.

PGR AVIATION FLEET

As of May there were 85 aircraft in the aerial eradication fleet covered by the U S.-financed maintenance contract: 57 rotary wing and 28 fixed wing. To show Mexican commitment to the eradication program, the PGR is purchasing 14 new Bell 206 B helicopters, with funds added to the regular 1987 budget. They will also purchase an initial spare parts package and outfit the aircraft with armor plate, radios, wirecutters and spray connections. The spray craft will be equipped with spray booms and tanks already on hand. The first nine have now been delivered; the PGR has indicated that it intends to maintain the 14 new aircraft apart from the U.S. financed maintenance contract.

PGR DRUG ERADICATION CAMPAIGN BUDGET

Mexico has increased its expenditure on its drug eradication campaign over the past four years, from 2.6 billion

pesos in 1984 to 21 billion pesos in 1987. In terms of U.S. dollars, the budget has remained fairly constant due to the rapid devaluation of the Mexican peso. High inflation and rapid depreciation of the peso against the dollar reduce the impact of the budget increases, however. Total expenditures in 1987 are estimated at $21.5 million -- an increase of over 120% in pesos over 1986 but only 23.6% in dollar terms. Almost the entire increase in spending for 1986 is allocated to the purchase of 14 new Bell 206 helicopters (plus spares) at a cost of just over $11 million.

MAINTENANCE CONTRACT

The major U.S. budgetary expenditure in the Mexico program and the key to successful eradication in Mexico is adequate aircraft maintenance support to ensure airworthiness and essential availablity to meet field operational requirements. The current maintenance contract is an INM-funded but PGR controlled "host country contract" between the Mexican Government and Serv-Air. The present contract was awarded on August 1, 1982 as a result of a competitive solicitation, and expires on December 31, 1987. The current contractor has considerable expertise in aircraft maintenance. The contract, however, does not charge the contractor with anything other than advisory responsibilities and does not invest the contractor with authority to control either the maintenance activity or the inventory of parts.

Earlier this year, to remedy the problem of lack of accountability, INM contracted with a firm to review the maintenance operation, make recommendations for improvement, and draft a scope of work, position description and qualifications profiles in preparation for the recompetition of the contract this summer. INM has proposed a U.S. administered contract but the PGR response, based primarily on the sovereignty issue, was negative. The Embassy is now negotiating with the PGR a draft statement of work for a US-funded host government contract which would: create a managerial/supervisory role for the contractor; charge the contractor with responsibility for inventory control; and require the contractor to establish a computerized inventory control system at the hanger in Mexico City to replace the present manual "Cardex" system.

PILOT SHORTAGE

A shortage of PGR pilots, mechanics and navigators, resulting largely from low salaries, has impeded the drug eradication campaign. The PGR granted a 40% pay raise in May retroactive to March 1. Nevertheless, because inflation in Mexico during the last 12 months has totaled 120%, the increase is not expected to cure the present pilot loss. While INM has

offered to supplement PGR wages in order to ameliorate the problem, the PGR has argued that "a man cannot serve two masters" and that salaries must remain a Mexican responsibility.

The loss of pilots is serious. Throughout this year the PGR has had only the minimum necessary. Now the PGR has reported that it lost 18 pilots in recent months (12 resigned and six died - not all work-related). These losses have been partially offset by hiring 13 new or former pilots and by retraining (with INM funds) seven fixed-wing pilots for rotary-wing duty at the Acapulco training center. The PGR states that enough pilots will be available for the start of Pacifico VIII. Until the steady loss of experienced pilots is reversed by establishing realistic salary levels, however, pilot training even in large numbers will not remedy the situation.

FIXED-WING OPERATIONS

A US effort was begun in the fall of 1986 to reinvigorate the eradication program and to provide special assistance to the GOM for the 1986-1987 season. This special assistance consisted of the assignment of up to five Turbo Thrush to the PGR with the objective of eradicating the maximum amount of poppy during the growing/harvesting season. It ended in March when the primary poppy season was drawing to a close and the last aircraft was reassigned to Central America for continuing operations against marijuana. Mexican resistance to the introduction and effective use of the Thrush was noted by most observers during the special program and it is believed that there is no future role for the aircraft in the PGR program.

SPARE PARTS

There is a $13 million plus spare parts inventory in the maintenance contract; much of this is excessive. The key to reducing the spare parts inventory in the Mexican aviation maintenance program is the improvement of procurement practices in order to control supply and parts ordering systems. Recent implementation of a computerized system within the Embassy for tracking orders, deliveries and inventory levels is expected to reduce inventory imbalances. The ready access to data that the system provides will help eliminate duplication of orders and depletion of inventories below recommended levels. Much of the inventory is in Bell helicopter parts. The Embassy is currently negotiating with Bell for the return of a portion of the inventory for credit against future purchases.

SPRAYING/HERBICIDES

We continue to reinforce a spray strategy based on spraying of both marijuana and opium poppy crops at all stages

of growth prior to maturity. In late April, the NAU and the PGR conducted tests of modified spray booms at Acapulco using different size booms and nozzle configurations to improve spray disposition and eliminate herbicidal contamination to the aircraft. Further evaluations are to be conducted.

In summary, although problems continue, the joint Mexico/United States eradication program has made progress in the last two years and we continue to work with the Government of Mexico to regain the narcotics control successes demonstrated in the late 1970's.

Statement

of

THOMAS V. CASH
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Operations
Drug Enforcement Administration

Before

The

Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control
House of Representatives

Concerning

Mexican Drug Trafficking and Enforcement

On

August 5, 1987

Chairman Rangel, Members of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control: I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss narcotics trafficking and enforcement in Mexico and the Drug Enforcement Administration's operations in this region.

DEA's mission abroad is to reduce the supply of illegal drugs from foreign source and transit countries. To accomplish this, DEA has special agents, diversion investigators, intelligence analysts, and support personnel stationed in 79 offices in 45 countries outside the United States, in addition to our domestic offices. In Mexico, DEA has 40 special agents permanently assigned to six offices throughout Mexico. In addition, we assign special agents to Mexico on temporary duty as needed.

## MEXICAN DRUG PRODUCTION AND TRAFFICKING

### Heroin

Mexico continues to be a major source of the heroin and marijuana available in the United States. In addition to the traditional brown heroin, Mexico also supplies the United States with "black tar" heroin, so called because of its dark color and gummy consistency. The process by which black tar heroin is

produced is a variation of the processing method used to manufacture traditional brown heroin. Of particular concern to the United States is the high purity of black tar heroin.

Unfortunately, ideal growing conditions have continued in Mexico for the fourth consecutive year. Agriculture, in general, and opium poppy cultivation, in particular, flourished. It is estimated that approximately 2.8 metric tons of heroin were available for export to the United States from Mexico in 1986, which is about the same as the prior year.

In 1986, DEA received reports that six heroin laboratories were dismantled in Mexico, an increase over the four seized in 1985. The 1986 figure cannot be confirmed because the Mexican government reported the seizure of a total of 15 illicit laboratories without identifying the type of drug under production. For 1986, Mexican authorities reported that 46.9 kilograms of heroin had been seized throughout Mexico, an increase over the 8.8 kilograms seized in 1985. Seizures of heroin continue to increase in 1987. During the first five months of 1987, according to their reports, the Government of Mexico seized 44.6 kilograms of heroin, compared to 6.1 kilograms of heroin seized during the same period in 1986.

2.

82-045 0 - 88 - 4

Marijuana

Marijuana seizures in Mexico have risen significantly during 1987, with an estimated 259 metric tons seized during the first five months. This represents an increase of 1,360 percent over marijuana seizures for the same period in 1986. In fact, the marijuana seizures for the first five months of 1987 have far surpassed the 192 metric tons reported seized in Mexico for all of 1986. In one seizure alone, in May 1987, the Mexican authorities eradicated 55 hectares of cannabis in the State of Sonora. This is the largest commercial marijuana operation discovered in that state to date, and it was capable of producing in excess of 136 metric tons of marijuana.

Marijuana seizures at the United States-Mexico border also have increased. In the first six months of 1987, over 76 metric tons were seized at the border, which is twice as much as the amount seized during the same period in 1986 and more than the entire amount of marijuana seized along the U.S. southwest border during all of 1986. The additional seizures have been due primarily to Operation Alliance/Full Press and the aggressive interdiction efforts being carried out by agents of the U.S. Border Patrol.

Cocaine

The use of Mexico as a transshipment point for cocaine destined for the United States is well-documented. Heightened law enforcement activity in the southeastern United States and the Caribbean is partially responsible for the shipment of cocaine through Mexico.

Colombian cocaine trafficking organizations continue to dominate all aspects of the international trafficking of cocaine to the United States. There are, however, a number of major Mexican traffickers who, upon delivery of the cocaine in Mexico, provide the final wherewithal to smuggle the cocaine into the United States. Colombian trafficking organizations have become aligned with Mexican traffickers to take advantage of the Mexicans' heroin and marijuana smuggling and distribution networks already in place in the United States.

Thus far in 1987, Mexico leads all other Latin American countries in the total quantity of cocaine hydrochloride seized. Mexican officials report more seizures of larger quantities of cocaine than ever before. During the first six months of this year alone, Mexican authorities reported seizing more than four metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride. We can compare this figure

to total 1986 Mexican seizures of over five metric tons of cocaine, which was twice the amount seized in 1985 and more than 10 times the 444 kilograms seized in 1984.

CAMARENA AND CORTEZ CASES

The February 1985 kidnaping and subsequent murder of DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena Salazar, as well as the August 1986 torture of Special Agent Victor Cortez by Jalisco State Police, severely strained bilateral law enforcement efforts in Mexico and have drawn greater attention to the Mexican narcotics trafficking situation.

In the Camarena case, Rafael Caro Quintero and Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo, prime suspects in the murder, remain in custody in Mexico City while their Mexican trials continue. There have been two more recent arrests in this case by Mexican police: Jose Luis Gallardo-Parra, one of Camarena's kidnapers, was arrested in March 1987. Antonio Vasquez-Velasco, who was one of the "pistoleros" in the employ of Fonseca and was present during the torture of Special Agent Camarena, was arrested this past June.

The Mexican Attorney General's office reports that a total of 64 suspects are now facing charges related to the Camarena case. Javier Barba Hernandez, a suspect who may have been one of Camarena's interrogators, was killed in November 1986 in a shootout with Mexican Federal Police.

In the United States, Mexican citizen Mario Martinez Herrera was convicted by a San Diego jury of perjury for lying to a grand jury investigating the Camarena case. He thus became the first person to be convicted in a United States court in this case. Martinez Herrera is believed to be a former Mexican Internal Security Agent who was present during Camarena's interrogation. He was sentenced to a year and a day for the perjury conviction.

In June 1987, Jesus Felix-Gutierrez (aka Cachas) pleaded guilty in Los Angeles to violation of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute for his involvement in the Guadalajara-based cocaine cartel responsible for the Camarena murder. The investigation of Felix-Gutierrez's involvement in the murder is continuing.

The Mexican Court has been provided Special Agent Victor Cortez's deposition, which was translated into Spanish. Recently, seven former Jalisco State police officers were charged with "Abuse of Authority," a violation of Mexican law, in the detention and beating of Special Agent Cortez. Five of the seven officers have been arrested and are being held in detention, and two remain fugitives.

## DEA COOPERATIVE OPERATIONS

DEA is currently involved in several cooperative operations that target the production in and transshipment of drugs through Mexico into the United States.

### Operation Vanguard

Operation Vanguard is part of the United States-Mexican bilateral eradication campaign which uses aerial reconnaissance for the purpose of detecting illicit cultivation of opium poppies and cannabis and verifying their eradication. This program has identified sizable increases in cannabis and opium poppy cultivation in previously purported eradicated areas, as well as in nontraditional growing sites.

United States resources for the Mexican eradication campaign are supplied by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) of the State Department. However, DEA plays a role in this campaign. DEA agents supply information regarding the locations of fields under cultivation to the eradication campaign. They also participate in the verification of the eradication efforts.

Although there is a 90 percent verification rate of fields reported to have been sprayed by the Mexican government, only a fraction of the fields reported sprayed are actually subject to verification.

Operation Alliance/Full Press

In August 1986 the Vice President, as head of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, and the Attorney General, as Chairman of the National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, announced the commencement of Operation Alliance on the Southwest border of the United States. It is a multi-agency law enforcement interdiction effort aimed at curtailing the flow of illicit drugs from and through Mexico into the United States.

The primary agencies involved in the actual interdiction activity are the U.S. Customs Service, the U.S. Border Patrol, the U.S. Coast Guard, and DEA. U.S. Customs has primary responsibility for air and ports of entry interdiction. The U.S. Border Patrol has been charged with land interdiction responsibility between the ports of entry, and the U.S. Coast Guard has primary responsibility for sea interdiction. Each agency is conducting separate operations as a part of the umbrella heading of Operation Alliance. These agencies are supported by state and local law enforcement agencies in border states and by several other Federal agencies.

DEA has primary responsibility for providing strategic, operational, and tactical drug trafficking intelligence, and is responsible for pursuing all domestic and international drug investigations resulting from Operation Alliance. DEA has committed sizable investigative and intelligence resources to support Operation Alliance, including the increase of its permanent special agent work force in southwest border offices by 97 special agents through FY 1987. DEA now has 115 special agents committed to Operation Alliance.

In addition, seven intelligence analyst positions have been added to DEA southwest border offices to enhance the analysis and dissemination of drug intelligence involving Mexico and the southwest border area. The Southwest Border Intelligence Task Force in DEA Headquarters provides strategic assessments of all aspects of drug trafficking from Mexico to the United States, as well as operational support to investigations targeted at violators trafficking drugs across our southwest border.

DEA offices in Mexico support Operation Alliance by daily reporting aircraft sighted at airfields within their geographic areas of responsibility to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). EPIC then provides the reporting offices and U.S. Customs air interdiction offices along the border with background

data on suspect aircraft. Since October 1986, EPIC has processed 1,485 aircraft sightings from DEA, of which 108 were positive hits on suspect aircraft. Three of these suspect aircraft were seized following their foreign sighting.

Operation Full Press, which began last October, is a DEA special enforcement operation conducted with the U.S. Border Patrol and supported by the U.S. Customs Service within Operation Alliance. Operation Full Press focuses on the interdiction of narcotics between and at the ports of entry and the initiation of follow-up investigations and prosecutions.

Operation Full Press, in its initial eight months of operation, achieved immediate tactical success. Highlights included a total of 468 investigative case referrals, over 550 arrests, and seizures of almost 29,400 kilograms of marijuana, more than 1,100 kilograms of cocaine, approximately 86,500 dosage units of dangerous drugs, approximately $105,000 in cash, and over 160 vehicles.

In support of the overall Operation Alliance initiative, DEA has delegated limited narcotic arrest, search, and seizure authority to approximately 2,800 U.S. Border Patrol agents who we trained in narcotic-related subjects and drug interdiction

methods. We believe that Operation Full Press has been successful because the U.S. Border Patrol's new expertise in drug law enforcement techniques has enhanced its existing professional approach to border interdiction.

In addition, DEA has provided full Title 21 investigative authority and training to approximately 150 U.S. Customs special agents participating in Operation Alliance.

## CONCLUSION

DEA believes that the drug law enforcement relationship between the United States and Mexico is on firmer ground than it has been in the recent past. On numerous occasions, the Attorneys General and Presidents of both countries have reaffirmed their goals in the drug suppression effort.

The Drug Enforcement Administration hopes that, in the coming months and years, bilateral agreements with Mexico will prove to be effective in stemming the flow of heroin, marijuana, and cocaine through the Mexican-United States border.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this Committee's continuing interest in Mexican-United States relations regarding drug law enforcement. I will be pleased to answer any questions you may have.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF
DWIGHT A. INK
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR
BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS ABUSE AND CONTROL
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, D.C.
AUGUST 5, 1987

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to come before this committee to testify on our proposed drug awareness program for Mexico. In order to appreciate the context within which A.I.D. narcotics control activities are carried out, I believe that it would be useful to review the Agency's involvement in the struggle against illicit drugs before examining the specific project that we plan to carry out in Mexico.

For many Latin American and Caribbean governments the political price of cooperating with the United States and other countries in the fight against illicit narcotics is very high. Drug abuse too often has been viewed by these governments and their citizens as a problem affecting only the industrialized consuming countries. The serious domestic consequences of drug abuse within the producing and processing countries have not been fully recognized in the past. In several countries, narcotics traffickers are assuming greater power, enabling them to challenge established government authority, operate freely in remote areas---often successfully challenging the police or

co-opting them---and exercise their corrupting influence throughout the political system. Their economic power threatens legitimate commercial enterprises, thus distorting an economic development process that attempts to rely on a rational system of prices and market signals. Growing ties between narcotics traffickers and armed terrorist groups further increase the influence of criminal forces and the political difficulties confronting Latin American democracies in taking action against the illicit drug problem.

A.I.D. narcotics awareness and education activities are designed to help countries realize the serious consequences of drug production, trafficking and use on individuals and families, and within a community. A public recognition of the problems of drug abuse is important since this can strengthen a government's resolve and ability to take firm action and lessen political opposition to positive government action. Building a constituency in support of controversial action against narcotics is vitally important in our overall battle against illicit drugs.

Narcotics awareness activities are also important for the impact that they have on drug consumption within developing countries. The cost of drug abuse within the developed world is staggering when measured by such standards as crime, lost workdays and lowered productivity and efficiency, and the

expense of treatment and rehabilitation facilities. This is a price that developing countries, which often cannot finance even basic health services, can ill afford. Thus, A.I.D. narcotics awareness activities have the potential over time to help reduce the overall economic development burden if they reduce drug consumption within the producing countries themselves. Unfortunately, most data that we have developed so far indicates that while drug abuse is starting from a relatively small base, it is growing rapidly within the Andean countries and is an emerging problem in Mexico, and already surpasses the capacity of most existing health systems to address effectively.

Narcotics awareness and education projects are only part of A.I.D.'s participation in the battle against narcotics. Another equally important aspect is the provision of alternative income and employment opportunities---a safety net of jobs and services---for former narcotics producers and processors that are compelled to find new employment because of crop eradication or effective drug enforcement and interdiction. This too, is related to the need for political support for drug control efforts. We have found that some Latin American governments have been very reluctant to undertake more aggressive efforts to eliminate the production and trafficking in narcotics because they fear the backlash

from farmers and laborers whose livelihood will be threatened. Thus, A.I.D. is financing area development activities in both Peru and Bolivia that will help provide services, infrastructure and jobs for those who have been forced out of coca cultivation.

I believe it is important to emphasize that these activities will not eradicate narcotics-producing crops or halt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. Their primary purpose is to assist host countries to lay the groundwork required for the difficult tasks of interdiction and eradication. In each country where we have A.I.D.-financed narcotics control programs, they are an integral part of the overall U.S. contribution to the effort to reduce the flow of drugs into the United States. Each activity is carried out under the general authority of the U.S. Ambassador in the affected country, and we collaborate with other interested agencies such as DEA, USIS and INM in developing A.I.D. programs. Our activities are interdependent, and no single approach by itself will solve the problem. Thus, for example, A.I.D. efforts to provide alternate income and employment are important, but cannot succeed without enhanced enforcement, sustained interdiction and eradication efforts that other U.S. agencies support.

Over the years A.I.D. has developed a number of strengths that enable this Agency to work effectively in the narcotics awareness area. First, A.I.D. has widespread experience in community development activities with private voluntary organizations. As a result, we give priority to nongovernmental awareness programs that involve a significant level of volunteer community participation. Also, A.I.D. has long been involved in developing self-sustaining institutions capable of eventually working without the need for further outside assistance. Our narcotics awareness activities are designed to develop new institutions as well as strengthen existing organizations to carry out demand reduction programs on a self-sustaining basis in the future. A.I.D. has a unique expertise in human resource development and the building of a commitment to follow through and apply the knowledge that one receives through A.I.D.-sponsored training. Finally, our work through private, nongovernmental organizations enables us to capture the strength of private sector representatives that have their own ties to the local community and their own ongoing commitment to improving a society. Capitalizing on these strengths ensures that narcotics awareness activities go forward as part of the values of a society, independent of changing political circumstances.

A.I.D. support for narcotics awareness is still a relatively new activity, but several projects which we have carried out recently are already leading to a greater appreciation of the drug problem and of the need for more effective government efforts to address it. Congressional appropriation of an additional $3 million for these activities in the Omnibus Drug Act of 1986 has enabled us to accelerate and expand these programs. I believe it would be helpful to look at our experience in other countries where awareness activities are operating before discussing the proposed Mexican project

We now have drug awareness programs underway in Bolivia, Peru, Colombia, Jamaica and Belize, while new projects are proposed to start soon in Mexico, Panama and Ecuador. Accomplishments of the Bolivian program, which got underway in FY 1985, include:

-- A study of the incidence and prevalence of drug abuse, which has provided a foundation for an on-going media effort to apprise Bolivians of the dimensions of their drug problem and encourage them to address it. It has shown that abuse cuts across geography, and affects all economic levels, including the very poor.

-- Nationwide weekly television shows explore in depth Bolivia's narcotics problem. Recently, four TV documentaries explored drug consumption, production and trafficking.

-- Local radio stations broadcast soap operas with anti-drug themes that appeal to Quechua-speaking campesinos and urban migrants.

-- A press service provides information on the drug problem to all media outlets.

-- The Bolivian Confederation of Private Businessmen has organized marches and demonstrations in the larger cities against drug abuse and has worked to oppose attempts by narcotraffickers to take over legitimate business concerns.

  o It recently sponsored a marathon in four cities with participants finishing at the sports stadium and taking a pledge not to use drugs.

  o It has launched a program to train neighborhood groups in how to defend their communities against drug traffickers.

The largest A.I.D.-assisted drug education program is being carried out in Peru. Accomplishments of this program include:

-- The creation of a private Peruvian organization to coordinate a sustained nation-wide public education program on drug issues.

  - o Some 80 Peruvians, including teachers, community leaders, labor spokesmen, novelists, university professors and political leaders joined together on a non-partisan basis to found a private institution to provide public education on drug abuse and drug problems.

  - o The Center for Drug Abuse Prevention, Information and Education (CEDRO) was created by the group and legally recognized by the Peruvian Government.

-- Completion of an epidemiological study in 1986 which has provided the basis for CEDRO's drug education and public awareness activities. The study concluded that drug and alcohol abuse was a serious problem in Peru and was getting increasingly worse.

-- CEDRO has initiated a national media campaign that includes the donation of free air time by a large number of radio and television stations.

-- CEDRO has excellent ties with other private and voluntary groups throughout the country, and it works through them to train community leaders, technicians and promoters. It has trained over 6,000 Peruvians and distributed thousands of pamphlets in less than a year since its founding.

In Belize, a national drug awareness program was initiated in 1985. Its purpose is to reduce the prevalence of drug abuse among Belizeans, particulary adolescents and young adults, through a cooperative effort of PVOs, and community, church and civic organizations (especially PTAs). The project is being coordinated by Parents' Resource Institute for Drug Education, Inc. (PRIDE).

Accomplishments to date include:

-- Completion of a national drug use prevalency survey for students aged 10-20.

-- Formation of youth groups and drug awareness action committees.

-- Holding of a national youth congress.

-- Creation of a resource center to publish a newsletter and provide to PTAs, church groups, and student groups audio-visual materials, drug information and lists of potential speakers.

Future activities will focus on:

-- Development and implementation of a mass media strategy targeted on youths, opinion leaders and parents and focused on the dangers of drugs to Belizean society;

-- Provision of technical assistance and audio visual resources to community, church and civic groups and schools to aid them in drug prevention efforts;

-- Directing of technical and material support to youth groups involved in peer assistance, with special attention to development of alternative "wholesome" activities for teenagers;

-- Conducting of operational research to determine the most effective ways to involve Belizean parents in preventing or controlling drug abuse by their children.

The program that we plan for Mexico will consist of a $400,000 grant to the Mexican Federation of Associations of Family Planning (FEMAP) to undertake a pilot "grass roots" narcotics public awareness campaign. The project will be financed through an Operational Program Grant to FEMAP, which will contribute at least $100,000 in additional funds from resources it will mobilize for the project. A.I.D. will finance the foreign exchange cost of goods and services, including a subcontract with Johns Hopkins University to design a narcotics awareness media program.

A.I.D. funds will come from the $3 million earmark for A.I.D. narcotics awareness activities in the 1986 Omnibus Drug Bill, for which the Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean will obligate over $2.2 million this fiscal year for activities in six countries. This project is part of an integrated narcotics awareness program in Mexico that includes additional activities carried out by USIS and INM.

The objectives of the Mexico project are as follows:

-- inform the community of Ciudad Juarez about the magnitude of its drug abuse problem;

-- develop consciousness within the community of the impact of drug abuse on the individual, family and society;

-- inform the community about the social costs of drug abuse;

-- promote active and responsible participation of all members of the population in combatting drug abuse;

-- mobilize community groups for massive, intensive and long-range action to prevent drug abuse;

-- serve a possible role as a pilot project in the event Mexico decides that the results are worth adapting to the needs of other areas in Mexico.

The project will consist of three related but discrete activities. The first part will be operations research to carry out a survey of 3,000 people in the Ciudad Juarez area to determine the percentage and characteristics of drug abusers and their habit patterns disaggregated by age, sex, education level, social status, and employment. Once this survey is completed the project will develop, test and evaluate social communications programs to reach the broad spectrum of the Ciudad Juarez population. We anticipate that activities will be implemented in the following areas:

-- press---weekly narcotics awareness campaign announcements to be published in two daily newspapers and two monthly drug awareness articles in daily papers reaching an estimated 90,000 readers per week;

-- TV---twelve TV spots of 30 seconds (six series of two spots) to reach an estimated 40,000 viewers; six 30 second narcotics prevention spots directed at children to reach 10,000 children per week;

-- Radio---32 spots of 30 seconds; four series of 8 topics, 8 times per day per station, to reach 200,000 listeners per day; and 12 mini-soap operas (using actual case histories of drug users) of 14 minutes, one per month, broadcast twice daily to reach 100,000 listeners per day.

-- conferences---24 per month to reach 1,200 people per month carried out by trained volunteers selected from the community;

-- pamphlets---design based on research results, to be distributed through various institutions to reach an estimated 100,000 readers.

The second major component of the project will be the design of alternative treatment programs to help meet the special needs of current drug abusers in Ciudad Juarez. The project will develop means to carry out the following activities:

-- community referral system for treatment and rehabilitation;

-- development of a job bank for addicts in treatment and rehabilitation;

-- information, referral and crisis intervention through a 24 hour hotline;

-- promotion of addict participation in community self-help projects; recreation/cultural activities; and microenterprises;

The final element of the project will be a subcontract with Johns Hopkins University to design a popular song-based media program using vocalist personalities selected to appeal to the teen-age/young adult population. In this regard I would like to remind the committee that Johns Hopkins, with A.I.D. support, undertook the "Tatiana and Johnny" family planning campaign, using two top Mexican pop singers, which has been enormously successful in reaching adolescents concerning sexual responsibility. We will expect Johns Hopkins to draw upon this successful experience to:

-- develop a major marketing plan based on research findings, supplemented by "focus" groups of young adults, parents and government officials;

-- prepare a marketing program including recording and mass dissemination;

-- contract a marketing and production firm;

-- evaluate the impact of the song-based media program on the drug problem in Ciudad Juarez;

-- design a strategy for expanding the program to other Mexican cities.

The planned Mexican program is a multifaceted and complex activity, and will be implemented over a one year period. Given FEMAP's experience in carrying out a number of community programs, we are confident it can responsibly implement this program. The project is cost effective. It will count on the contribution of hundreds of unpaid volunteers and community leaders. Good use will be made of donated radio and television time. I am confident it can have a positive impact on Ciudad Juarez' recognition of its drug problem and commitment to solve it.

In conclusion, it is unrealistic to expect A.I.D.-supported narcotics awareness activities to eliminate political opposition to the difficult narcotics control measures that

many Latin American countries are carrying out. But, these A.I.D.-supported activities are an important component of an overall strategy to lessen opposition and to build community and political support for enforcement actions against narcotics traffickers. Our initial efforts in a number of countries already have created a foundation for more aggressive enforcement and control efforts. We believe it is important to give emphasis to the program in Mexico, and plan to move forward quickly in implementing the program with the Mexican Federation in Ciudad Juarez.

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

United States Department of State

*Washington, D.C. 20520*

OCT 1 [illegible]

Dear Mr. Chairman:

During the hearings on Mexico held by the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control on August 5, 1987, you asked Mr. Paul D. Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs to provide for the record a listing of those occasions in which Secretary Shultz spoke publicly on the narcotics problem. We have researched this subject and have found that the Secretary has spoken out on this issue many times.

For instance, on September 14, 1984 the Secretary devoted an entire speech to this theme when speaking before the Miami Chamber of Commerce. This speech was entitled " The Campaign Against Drugs: The International Dimension." More recently, Secretary Shultz delivered on May 4, 1987 in Washington an address entitled " Narcotics: A Global Threat" before the Narcotics Coordinators Conference held by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. On other occasions, narcotics was a major but not exclusive focus of several major policy addresses. One such speech was before the General Assembly of the Organization of American States last November. Another, also occurring last year, was before the Locust Club in Philadelphia. In addition, the Secretary has dealt with the issue in several appearances before the Congress. For your information, we are enclosing copies of some of these addresses.

In addition to these speeches, the Secretary has expressed his concern about the narcotics issue on numerous other occasions both on and off record.

We hope that you and members of your Committee find this material useful.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

The Honorable
Charles B. Rangel,
Chairman,
Select Committee on Narcotics
Abuse and Control,
U.S. House of Representatives.

Several submissions attached to the State Department response included the following speeches, addresses, and statements by Secretary of State Shultz:

Current Policy No. 611
Current Policy No. 992
Current Policy No. 909
Current Policy No. 967
Current Policy No. 891
Current Policy No. 884

All of the above are in the files of the Select Committee.

The following information is in response to the request by Congressman Traficant:

UNITED STATES
COCAINE SEIZURES (AIR)

KILOGRAMS SEIZED

| | CY-1986 | OCT-DEC 86 | JAN-JUN 86 | JAN-JUN 87 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA | 140 | - | 30 | 113 |
| CA | - | - | - | - |
| CA | - | - | - | - |
| CA | - | - | - | - |
| AZ | 643 | 643 | -- | - |
| AZ | 318 | - | 318 | 571 |
| AZ | - | - | - | - |
| AZ | - | - | - | - |
| AZ | - | - | - | - |
| AZ | - | - | - | - |
| NM | - | - | - | - |
| NM | - | - | - | - |
| NM | - | - | - | - |
| NM | 560 | - | 22 | - |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | 321 | 321 | - | - |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | 444 | - | 57 | - |
| TX | - | - | - | 22.5 |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | 53.6 | 40 | 1.6 | -- |
| TX | 493 | - | 493 | - |

UNITED STATES
COCAINE LAND SEIZURES
KILOGRAMS SEIZED

| | CY-1986 | OCT - DEC 86 | JAN- JUN 86 | JAN-JUN 87 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CA | 909.0 | 4.3 | 51.3 | 677.2 |
| CA | 26.5 | - | 26.7 | - |
| AZ | 5.4 | 2.0 | - | 255.0 |
| AZ | 14.2 | 12.3 | 1.0 | 5.0 |
| AZ | 249.0 | 202.9 | 23.0 | 564.8 |
| NM | 26.2 | - | - | - |
| NM | - | - | - | - |
| TX | 22.3 | .6 | 6.8 | 3.8 |
| TX | .6 | - | .062 | 305.0 |
| TX | - | - | - | - |
| TX | .5 | .5 | - | - |
| TX | 502.3 | 37.0 | 377.3 | 316.9 |
| TX | 532.8 | 502.9 | 28.0 | 5.0 |

Source: EPIC

Seizures in Mexico
Provided by the Government of Mexico
July 1986 and July 1987

| | 1986 | 1987 |
|---|---|---|
| Heroin kg. | .7 | 1.7 |
| Cocaine kg. | 189.5 | 244.1 |
| Marijuana kg. | 245.3 | 12,628.1 |
| Depressants du. | 2,872 | 8,235 |
| Stimulants du. | 285 | 2,791,411 |
| Arrests | 326 persons | 788 persons |

Seizures in Mexico
Provided by the Government of Mexico
January - July 1986 and January - July 1987

| | 1986 | 1987 |
|---|---|---|
| Heroin kg. | 10.5 | 48.6 |
| Cocaine kg. | 3,563.3 | 3,964.9 |
| Marijuana kg. | 29,397.6 | 298,475.1 |
| Depressants du. | 83,055 | 172,833 |
| Stimulants du. | 39,786 | 2,785,799 |
| Arrests | 2,595 persons | 5,483 |

Total 1986 Seizures in Mexico

| | |
|---|---|
| Heroin | 46.9 kg. |
| Cocaine | 5,323.4 kg. |
| Marijuana | 192,806.7 kg. |
| Depressants | 190,876 du. |
| Stimulants | 95,923 du. |
| Arrests | 9,735 persons |